Clinical Bioethics Blog : Bioethicist : Bernard W. Freedman : Medical Consulting, Ethics, End of Life Decisions

CDC Statistics Traumatic Brain Injuries

On August 29, 2011 the Canadian Medical Association published the findings of a multicenter cohort study evaluating the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for patients who had suffered a traumatic brain injury. This study is of particular interest because by the nature of the injury  patients cannot make decisions for themselves and generally such decisions in patients in end-of-life care have a variety of comorbidities which make an evaluation of the efficacy of the decisions to withdraw life sustaining care difficult. 

720 patients were evaluated from six different major medical centers. Of the 720, 228 patients did not survive.  160 patients had life sustaining treatment withdrawn in the first three days of hospitalization.

 In approximately 50% of the patients, deaths occurred within the first three days of admittance to the ICU. Most of the deaths were associated with withdrawing life-sustaining care (64%) yet the proportion varied significantly across the six medical centers, from 30.4% to 92.9%

Considering deaths due to withdrawal of life-sustaining care within the first three hospital days, an overall average of 45.6% occurred. However examining the outcomes from the six medical centers, the range of deaths due to withdrawal of life-sustaining care ranged from 22.2% to 59.1%.

According to the “medical teams” and who participated in the care, the reason given for withdrawing life-sustaining care was:

1.     Poor chance of survival. (54.4%).

2.     Prognosis was incompatible with the patient’s wishes. (33.8%)

3.     A poor long-term neurologic prognosis. (28.5%)

These stated justifications are suspect because of the rapidity that decisions to withdraw life-sustaining care were arrived at. As the authors of this study indicate:

 “in this specific population of patients, the decision to withdraw life-sustaining therapy made by patients’ relatives and medical teams is mainly based on prognostic information. Our findings are particularly concerning because many decisions to withdraw life-sustaining therapy were made early in our study: 64% of the patients who died within three days of admission to an ICU had life-sustaining therapy withdrawn. In some instances, this may be too early for accurate neuroprognostication.”

1. “Poor chance of survival. (54.4%)”

     Means: She is probably going to die soon anyway, so let’s not wait and see, waste our time and costs, and extubate now.

This is a, " She is probably going to die soon so let's not wait and see  and waste time and costs and extubate now" type of argument.

Yet, if the patient is going to die “soon” anyway, why not let her die without withdrawing the ventilator - for example. Waiting can only help us have a clearer picture of the degree of the damage and whether or not the patient will show any improvement in her neurologic status?

           2.  “Prognosis was incompatible with the patient’s wishes. (33.8%)”

 This is a “He wouldn’t want to live this way” kind of reasoning. If the physicians for this patient could say to the family, something like: “I can tell you with authority that your son will never be able to have any modicum of awareness, he will never eat on his own, …” If this could be established then the “He wouldn’t want to live this way” reasoning may be an ethically sufficient decision, if in fact the wishes of the patient are clear. However, without such a established prognosis, how can we arrive at a reasonable assessment as to what, exactly, the patient would want. There is little ability to actually assess whether decisions to withdraw life support are genuinely the patient wishes or the wishes of others.

The question that must be posed is whether or not waiting will clarify the prognosis of the patient. If so, then it is indeed premature to withdraw. The fact that, as determined in this study, most patients die after withdrawal from ventilation support, serves to emphasize the need to wait.

“A poor long-term neurologic prognosis. (28.5%)”

This is a: “he probably will survive, but, …” argument. This is the worse excuse of the three listed. It states that: “he probably will survive and if we do not remove life support while he still needs it, someone will probably have to take care of him later. This is tantamount to homicide. We have a non-terminal patient with undetermined future neurologic status who we are going to withdraw life sustaining care to end his life. The total number of patients studied in this cohort was 720. 492 patients did survive, with considerable variability between the participating medical centers.  The authors’ state:

“This raises the concern that differences in mortality between centers may be partly due to variation in physician’s perceptions of long-term prognosis and physicians practice patterns for recommending withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy.”

It is the job of the physicians to treat the patient, not satisfy the needs of the family. Hence, great care must be taken to determine and effectuate the wishes of the patient.

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Rationing "scarce medical resources" and lying to the patient - do these go hand in hand?

7 comments

Claudia Ruiz M.D • I don't think so, I'm from Mexico, and I have worked plenty with the mayan communities, they really don't have any acces to medicines o medical attention. We did our best to get them what they need, but sometimes it is impossible. Anyways, I never lie to my patients, they deserve to know the truth always. Maybe it is a different situation in the United States and the HMOs, but in principle, I don't think it is ethical to lie and withhold information to people, specially if that information is for the best of the patient.

Henry Levenson,M.D. • No, rationing health care does not equal lying to patients. It is better to explain to the best of your ability why referrals were declined or not authorized. Patients seem to assume that physicians are responsible for the reasons why health care is rationed.

M. Sara Rosenthal • In the U.S., rationing is usually not done according to an ethical framework (such as beneficence); it is usually done according to "ability to pay": if we were transparent about THAT -- we wouldn't have opposition to universal healthcare in the U.S. by the very people who could benefit from it. Transparency about access is really the issue.

Bernard Freedman, JD, MPH • Follow up Comment: Rationing : Withholding Medical Care by Lying to the Patient 

"Rationing" of medical care and “triage” are different. 

Triage prioritizes the use of limited medical resources when sufficient resources are not available. 

Rationing is the withholding of available care for political/economic reasons. 
With respect to rationing, therefore, it must be decided whether or not the patient is going to be told the truth. 

The ethical question here is whether patients must be told that medical care is being withheld, or if a standard practice will sanction lying to their faces. 
In his book “Pricing Life” Dr. Peter Ubel provides us with his definition of rationing. He says that the clinician must, 
(1) Withhold, withdraw or fail to recommend a service that, in the clinician’s best judgment, is in the patient’s best medical interests; 
(2) Act primarily to promote the financial interest of someone other than the patient, including an organization, society at large, or the clinician himself or herself, and 
(3) Have control over the use of the medically beneficial service” (Pricing Life – why it is time for health care rationing, Peter A. Ubel, M.D., MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 2000). 
The phrase “withhold, withdraw or fail to recommend” defines rationing as outright dishonesty with the patient – violative of the legally required fiduciary role in physician-patient relationships. 
So, I agree with Dr. Rosenthal that, indeed, transparency is the real issue

Marie Cartwright • Withholding, withdrawing or failing to recommend a service does not imply, in any way, dishonesty. It rather describes an informed attitude a physician will take towards a patient regarding a particular procedure and their candidacy for that procedure. A physician, for instance, can withhold a procedure from a patient while still being honest about the reasons for doing so, and rightly so. 

In the UK, for instance, candidates for hip replacement surgeries are (or were several years ago) denied the surgery until they brought their BMIs down to a healthy level. In other words, obese candidates were denied hip replacements based solely on their weight. I initially struggled with this particular topic because it seemed to have a tone of infinite regression- patients who required hip replacements would have a much easier time reaching a healthy weight if they had a healthy hip! However, if the supply is far less than the demand, we must also take into account that obese patients who received a hip replacement would also probably need another replacement sooner than those within a healthy weight range. 

In terms of honestly, however, the patient-doctor relationship cannot exist without trust. Lying should never be present, under any circumstances.

Bernard Freedman, JD, MPH • Thanks for the discussion. This is a growing quandary that calls for clarity from medical, ethical and public policy points of view. There is a difference between withholding or withdrawing efficacious treatment and telling a patient what you are doing and why, and “failing to recommend” an efficacious treatment and keeping it a secret under the guise of having what you call an “informed attitude.” So, I must ask, what is it that informs a physician’s attitude that justifies keeping the decision hidden? In other words lying to the person you have the highest duty to be honest with. Yet, you say in the next sentence of your comment that it is ok to” withhold the treatment while still being honest about the reasons for doing so.” I am unclear whether you are really saying that withholding the truth, lying, is acceptable. 
You give the example of the obese patient who needs a hip replacement but is denied the surgery unless he or she loses the weight. The denial may be justified, but is the patient told the reason for the denial? Do you tell your patient that they must lose weight before the hip replacement will be permitted? Of course, I believe, you do. Otherwise there would be no incentive for the patient to lose the weight. 
It is the trust aspect, the moral imperative of truth telling between physician and patient that is, I believe, at risk when rationing truly scarce resources.

Marie Cartwright • I think we are on the same page in many respects here. But, if I may clarify a possible misunderstanding- You said, "So, I must ask, what is it that informs a physician’s attitude that justifies keeping the decision hidden?" I definitely didn't intend to imply that physicians should keep their decisions, or reasons for their decisions, hidden. I believe quite the opposite. By informed attitude, I meant to refer to the physicians as "gatekeepers" who decide who can have what procedure, and when, and their decisions, or attitudes, are informed by factors solely about the patient. Physicians, after all, are the experts that we rely upon to help us better our health and in some circumstances, "save" us. In essence, and hopefully to answer your question, withholding a treatment and withholding the truth are two entirely different things. In my previous comment, I said that withholding a particular treatment is in no way dishonest. However, withholding a treatment without justifying or explaining it to the patient goes against the patient-doctor relationship and also is counter productive for any patient's treatment. 

Regarding the hip replacement patients, I believe the the denial must, in all situations, be explained to the patient. I don't really believe that truth telling is at risk in any situation, much less the rationing situation. A patient must be told why he/she is no longer a candidate for a particular procedure. Even when supply is scarce, to be dishonest serves no purpose.

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Efforts to encourage (or compel) physicians to lie to their patients were faced years ago when “gag clauses” were inserted into contracts between HMO’s and contracted physicians. The gag clause established a contractual obligation on the part of the physician to withhold information regarding treatment modalities that were not within the HMO protocol of allowable categories of care. 

Contractually, it is common to exclude specific types or categories of care - “We will pay for this, we won’t pay for that.” Every contract of insurance has exclusions. Gag clauses, however, go further. They contractually bar physicians from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the patient from making clear what relevant treatments are available in the medical community. If there were more effective treatments available, the physician nevertheless had to withhold such information. Physicians, therefore, had to choose whether to breach their fiduciary duty to their patient, or breach their contractual duty to the HMO if they revealed the availability of superior care for the patient.

For a patient, there was no real choice. No information that would enable a comparison between alternative treatments, nor any opportunity to confer with other physicians regarding alternative treatments.

This, to be clear, is fraud: purposeful misrepresentation and intentional withholding of critical information by a fiduciary and relied upon by the patient to his or her detriment, namely serious injury or death.

In 1990s, the AMA asked managed care organizations to withdraw gag clauses from their contracts with physicians. Though gag clauses have drifted, we hope, out of existence, medical rationing resurrects the same fraudulent behavior and, again, attempts to persuade or compel physicians to participate in the entire charade.

Patients will have to be told the truth unless our moral foundations of democracy are to be drastically diminished. If the informed consent process is genuine it must reveal to the patient all alternative methods of treatment – whether they can afford it or not. Patients are accustomed to being told that certain categories of treatments, though needed, may not covered by their insurance. If the policy is ambiguous then that issue of coverage can be legally and rapidly challenged.

Protocols to ration health care, if they surreptitiously contribute to the worsening of illness or death, will once again be an attempt by those who make policy to encourage or compel physicians to change from their absolute loyalty to their patient to become coerced agents of fraudulent socioeconomic policy.

Part III to follow: Efforts to Ration Care and Value Based Medicine

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Rationing : Withholding Medical Care by Lying to the Patient

Rationing of medical care and “triage” are different.

Triage prioritizes the use of limited medical resources when resources are insufficient for immediate treatment. 

Rationing is the withholding of available care for political/economic reasons.

With respect to rationing, therefore, it must be decided whether or not the patient is going to be told the truth.

The requirement of informed consent cannot cease to exist because of political/economic policy. Nevertheless the degree of informed consent may vary with the degree and type of risk. Informed consent for a blood pressure medication may not require any specific discussion if the medications are reasonably the same in term of efficacy of treatment.

The physician has an affirmative duty to raise the question and answer such questions by describing all “available” treatment.

On the other end of the spectrum, withholding information about hemodialysis in a patient with multi-organ failure requires an explanation of all risks of treatment and non-treatment alike. Life expectancy, quality of life, prolongation of the process of dying and so on must be discussed in specific detail. Religious considerations may come into play as well. For example, some religious doctrines draw a line between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” care – ordinary care being required, where extraordinary care is not.

Nor can a physician simply wait to see if the patient inquires about other treatment that may be available. The physician has an affirmative duty to raise the question and answer such questions and breaking down “available” methods of treatment.

Part II will address policy considerations and legal ramifications of rationing medical care.

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Physician Liability: Withdrawing and Withholding Life Sustaining Care From  Conscious, Non Terminal, Incompetent Patients – Part II

There are different standards that must be appreciated and respected before a physician can support a decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment from a non terminal and incompetent patient.

This scenario requires the highest degree of protection for the patient. Our fundamental rights are the most important when we are the most vulnerable. Patients in this category are weak, often confused and subject to the effect of bias and undue influence. When illness requires life sustaining treatment family members may experience sympathy for the patient as well as opportunity to end their burden of caring for the patient. Some family members have said to others: "you have done so much, your life has been put on hold, how can we afford to pay for this care, etc. This can result in a request to withdraw or withhold artificial life support for what may be seen as being in every one's best interest. This often occurs in adult children caring for an elderly parent or spouse.

This responsibility for caring for patients at home falls predominantly on women. Women often care for both an elderly parent and their young children at the same time. Many, as well, must work to support the family. Yet, this understandable burden cannot be used as a justification or rationale for the termination of life sustaining treatment. Physicians must never allow themselves to place the needs of the family above the best interests of the patient. Physicians must not allow family interests to become a guide to decision making – even if it results in volatile or abusive confrontations with, or threats by, family members.

Withdrawing life sustaining care from a conscious, non-terminal patient, even if competent who refuses artificial life support, is thwart with risk for the treating physician. In a California case that was ultimately decided be the State Supreme Court, barred withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally conscious, non-terminal patient when there was not clear and convincing evidence that refusing treatment would be what the patient would want if able to speak for himself.

 

The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society deems necessary in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision…. Thus, “the standard of proof may depend upon the ‘gravity of the consequences that would result from an erroneous determination of the issue involved. …courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when necessary to protect important rights.

The legislature in Pennsylvania dealt with this dilemma by specifically codifying a limitation on physicians precluding the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment in non-terminal patients whether competent or not.

Health care necessary to preserve life shall be provided to an individual

who has neither an end-stage medical condition nor is permanently

unconscious,… 20 Pa.C.S. §5462(c)(1).

If a demand is made by a surrogate decision maker to terminate life sustaining care in a non terminal, conscious and incompetent patient, physicians, as a matter of customary practice, should request immediate review by the ethics committee as well as an experienced clinical bioethicist, followed by written recommendation which should be placed in the patient's chart. This will provide support and protection against liability risk for all physicians on the case, and protect the patient.  Thereafter, if there is any disagreement between the physicians, ethics committee member, bioethicist, or surrogate decision makers, or other family members or close friends, consideration should be given to petition the court for review.

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The September 2010 publication of “The Hospitalist” reviews the overall survival rates for cardiac arrest patients.

This article reports that patients frequently have unrealistic expectations and overestimate their chances of survival. Patients predict post-arrest CPR survival at 64%, while the rate is 17%. Most important is that in nearly half of the patients who initially expressed the desire for CPR, once they were informed of the actual estimates, they changed their minds and code status was changed.

It is difficult for many hospitalists to discuss DNR orders with patients. There is not a trusting relationship formed over time. Therefore it is often difficult to broach the subject with patient's or their surrogate decision makers.

For an in-depth and legitimate conversation leading to an informed consent to take place there must be a serious and comprehensive discussion of the patient's history and resuscitation statistics to the degree that they are reliable and clinically significant. The article notes that the “presence of hepatic insufficiency, acute stroke, immunodeficiency, renal failure, or dialysis were associated with lower survival rates.” The authors also note that survival rates are lower with metastatic disease and other malignancies.

Age and a history from prior skilled nursing facilities were associated with poorer survival rates and racial statistics also play a part in survival rates. This article discusses a study that reviewed the medical records of 433,985 Medicare patients 65 years and older who underwent in-hospital CPR. Patients 85 and older had a 6% chance of surviving hospital discharge. This, however, is a statistic and cannot be provided to patients without a detailed discussion of their specific medical condition. Survival rates tend to be lower in patients who are black/nonwhite. Blacks and nonwhites are reported to use CPR at a higher rate but with lower survival rates.

Most importantly, any discussion must include a description of the probable quality of life with post arrest survival. The authors take note that in post resuscitation survivors, in 86% of patients with pre-arrest cognitive abilities remain the same on discharge.  Please note that a boilerplate prediction of survival will not pass legal muster.

A Cautionary Note: We should also be alert to the fact that some patients may tend to have a grimmer perspective of survival because of a diagnosis of a malignancy, albeit the cancer is in early stages and not immediately life-threatening. Fear of “cancer” does frighten patients to the point where they will opt for a DNR order prematurely when it may result in an unnecessary early death. Hospitalists, therefore, must include a detailed description of cancer staging, and in such instances take a wait and see position to allow the discussion to continue with the patient’s primary treating physician.

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The New Jersey Superior Court–Appellate Division dismissed the appeal in Betancourt v Trinitas finding the appeal moot. The court stressed it's concern over the  “sparse record” presented at the time of  the original hearing in the trial court as well as on appeal and found that the evidence was not “conclusive in several areas necessary to fully adjudicate the substantial issues raised.” This is sometimes referred to as insufficiency of evidence. If the person or entity bringing the case does not provide sufficient evidence the court will dismiss the claim. In this case Tinitas Hospital's request to withdraw the ventilator.

 Ruben Betancourt, 72 years old, was unconscious following the dislodging of a ventilator breathing tube after surgery at Trinitas Medical Center, which resulted in anoxic encephalopathy. He was readmitted to Trinitas in July 2008 with a diagnosis of renal failure. He received dialysis treatments, remained on a ventilator, and feeding tube. The physicians at Trinitas diagnosed Mr. Betancourt as being in a persistent vegetative state and told the family of their intention to stop dialysis and allow him to die.

 “We do not decide the issue but raise it to emphasize why the “thin” and disputed record is so critical to a full analysis.”

The Superior Court in New Jersey (trial court) held a two day hearing and thereafter enjoined the hospital from withdrawing life support without the consent of Betancourt's daughter, Jacqueline, who was appointed his guardian. Mr. Betancourt remained at Trinitas, on the ventilator, receiving dialysis and on a feeding tube until his death in May 2009. The case nevertheless went forward because the attorneys argued that this dilemma is a common occurrence and needs to be clarified by the court.

What this court clarified is that insufficient evidence was presented to consider the issues of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.  As I pointed out in my previous post: 

            “… the physicians caring for this patient are required to place before the surrogate all medical evidence.

1.        CT and MRI scans,

2.        EEGs,

3.        All respiratory records and any potential to wean him from the ventilator. 

4.        Does he have a tracheostomy?

5.        Are his serious bed sores being tended to or ignored?

6.        What infectious disease is he suffering from?

7.        Is he responding to antibiotics?

8.        To what degree was his brain damaged due to anoxic encephalopathy?

9.        Has the physicians and or hospital discussed the events leading up to the hypoxic event, or hid from it because of concern of liability.

10.      Has all evidence been preserved, provided to the surrogate

11.       Has the ethics committee reviewed the case? If so where is their written report, findings and recommendations?

12.       Have bioethicists and or lawyers participated in conferences with  surrogate?

13.           ETC.

The surrogate cannot perform the job of a surrogate in the dark. This is where detailed records of the conversations and meeting held with the surrogate, family and physicians and reports from the ethics committees are critical to the surrogate’s understanding the issues in order to make a legitimate decision.”

"The uncertainty and lack of true consensus as to Rubin's condition may generate a result that will not only apply to a patient in a non-cognitive, vegetative state, but to a patient who is impaired and in possession of some level of awareness.”

Attorneys representing the hospital chose not to bring necessary evidence. Attorneys pick and choose what evidence they wish to disclose as favorable to their client’s position. We can only surmise that the evidence not produced was not favorable. It is often said that bad facts make bad law. A case of great importance to so many must be decided on clear findings of fact.

“…the judge concluded that Ruben was unconscious and in a persistent vegetative state. As it was not necessary to the decision that he reached, the judge made no specific findings, however, concerning Rubin's ability to perceive pain or react to his surroundings. The uncertainty and lack of true consensus as to Rubin's condition may generate a result that will not only apply to a patient in a non-cognitive, vegetative state, but to a patient who is impaired and in possession of some level of awareness.”

The absence in evidence of the usual procedures when an impasse is reached between physicians and patients is to call for help – from consulting bioethicists and ethics committees who will bring to bear physicians of various specialties, lawyers, lay people and clergy from the community. The surrogate decision maker would then have the benefit of views - and the reasons therefore – to consider facts outside any adversarial proceeding.

There was no indication that this review or participation of the bioethics consultant, or even be ethics committee, was involved in the attempt to resolve the dispute between the patient's surrogate and be patient's physician.

Thus, the attorneys representing the hospital did not give to the trial court sufficient facts to make a decision to the grant the withholding of life-sustaining treatment to Mr. Betancourt. .  As the court said in the opinion in this case: “We do not decide the issue but raise it to emphasize why the “thin” and disputed record is so critical to a full analysis.”

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At present the Missouri State Senate is considering new legislation (SB 365), which means to provide health insurance coverage for Phase I and Phase II clinical trials for cancer treatment. The law in the state of Missouri presently limits mandated insurance coverage to Phase III and Phase IV clinical trials.

Aside from the fact that this bill makes no sense whatsoever, it highlights the ignorance of what Phase I or Phase II trials are intended to accomplish. SB 365 seeks to force insurers, non profit health services plans, or health maintenance organizations to treat Phase I and II trials as if they are treatment – beneficial to the patient – which they certainly are not.  Since neither Phase I nor Phase II clinical trials are deemed treatment, or have any reasonable expectation of any real benefit to the patient, it makes no sense to compel payment for claims unrelated to actual health care treatment. 

Phase I trials are used solely to determine levels of toxicity of the drug being investigated. Phase II trial try to determine if the drug being investigated has any effect on the underlying disease, in this instance, cancer. Prior law in Missouri did make some sense by requiring insurance coverage for phase III and phase IV clinical trials would be covered because of, at least, the opportunity of benefit the patient i.e. actual therapeutic treatment. 

The bill then, in contradiction of the scheme of clinical trials, requires that “available clinical or preclinical data must provide a reasonable expectation that the treatment will be superior to the non-investigational alternatives.” This is outright stupidity because by the nature of phase I and phase II clinical trials there cannot be any clinical or preclinical data that provides any reasonable expectation that there is any treatment, actual therapeutic care, that will be gained. The bill seems to suggest that the patient will benefit from coverage for “routine patient care costs incurred for drugs…” The proposed legislation, however, defines “routine patient care cost” are the necessary costs needed to administer the drug under evaluation in the clinical trial, not actual care and treatment that will protect the patient. Accordingly, this proposed legislation is a sham, forcing insurers to pay for investigational drug research being performed by pharmaceutical companies, government, biotech companies, academia and privately run (outsourced) clinical trial programs.  

      All costs for Phase I and II trials should be born by the research investigators, including all necessary medical costs for the patient’s underlying condition as well as care during the clinical trial and thereafter to the degree that treatment is related to ill effects or adverse reaction to the drugs or medical devices being investigated.

This proposed legislation is unconstitutional by interfering in the right of freedom of contract because it requires payment for things outside the purview of the insurance contact for actual medical, therapeutic treatment.            

Many states are considering, or have passed, similar legislation. For example in Arizona (SB 1213 2000) requires cost for patient care associated with clinical trials phase I through 4. Yet coverage is limited when no clearly superior non-investigational treatment exists. California has passed the same legislation limited to , “when no clearly superior non-investigational treatment exists.” The confusion here is that neither Phase I or Phase II trials are “treatment.”

Colorado (HB 09-1059-2009) requires a similar coverage, but only when the physician believes that the patient may benefit from the clinical trial and when the patient has a disabling progressive or life threatening condition.

Connecticut (SB 325-2001) mandates coverage, but only in Phase III clinical trials and only if they involve “therapeutic intervention.” This legislation makes sense because it is limited to instances of “therapeutic intervention.”

Similarly Delaware (SB 181-2001) mandates coverage only when the clinical trial provides “therapeutic intent and where the trial is not designed exclusively to test toxicity or disease pathophysiology. This would, therefore, exclude coverage of Phase I and Phase II trials.

Indiana (HB 1382-2009) is similar to the confusion of the Missouri bill because it requires cost to be paid for Phase 1 through phase IV cancer clinical trials – but only when there is no clearly superior non-investigational alternative care available, and when the clinical data shows that the care method used in the research study is likely to work as well as approved care. This condition may make sense in Phase III or IV trials but not feasible in Phase I or II trials.

North Carolina (SB 199-2001) has some interesting additions. Patients who are suffering from life threatening disease or chronic condition may designate a specialist who is capable of coordinating their health care needs and insurers do not have to pay for “investigative” clinical trials. Similarly Wisconsin (AB 617-2006) limits insurers’ responsibility for payments when trials are intended to improve the participants’ health outcome and not designed only to test toxicity or disease pathophysiology – thus eliminating mandated coverage in Phase I and II trials.

The level of misunderstanding (feigned or actual) of the purpose of Phase I and Phase II clinical trials will have to be dealt with by the Federal Court of Appeals and possibly the Supreme Court to provide constitutional clarity as well as uniformity throughout the various States.

In addition to the confusion is a significant problem of giving credence to recruiting efforts Phase I and II cancer patients by giving the impression that Phase I and II trials are therapeutic and “paid for by your insurance company.” Informed consent is especially important in Phase II and II trials. These laws summarized above should not tend to lessen the requirement of detailed and well documented informed consent.

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 It has been 17 years since this bill was first introduced.

The New York State Senate will pass the Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA), setting forth clear guidelines for family members and others close to the patient to make medical decisions for incapacitated patients. It will also provide physicians with uniform protocols to follow. In many instances there will continue to be confusion and concern for the rights of the patient. Diligent and thoughtful efforts will be needed to apply these guidelines properly. The following are some of the important points for clinicians:

If there is disagreement about whether the individual lacks decision-making capacity, the matter is referred to the hospital or nursing home ethics committee for resolution.
 
       
The FHCDA directs the surrogate to make decisions in accordance with the patient’s wishes, including the patient’s religious and moral beliefs. 

A surrogate may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for an individual if that individual will die within six months with or without treatment, as determined by two independent physicians, and treatment would be an extraordinary burden to the patient.

A surrogate may also withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment if the patient has an irreversible condition, as determined by two independent physicians, and treatment would involve such pain, suffering, or other burden that it would be inhumane or extraordinarily burdensome to provide treatment under the circumstances. 

 
For Individuals Without a Surrogate:

The attending physician to act as surrogate for routine medical treatment. 

For major medical treatment, a physician may act only upon the concurrence of another physician that such major medical treatment is necessary. 

A physician may withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment for individuals without a surrogate only upon the independent concurrence of another physician that life-sustaining treatment offers no medical benefit to the patient because the patient will die imminently and the provision of life-sustaining treatment would violate accepted medical standards.

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A recent article in the Journal of the American Medical Association, JAMA, discusses the need for effective public health announcements to encourage people to explain their end of life wishes and their values, goals and preferences. It has been well established that physicians are reluctant to discuss end of life choices with their patients and the norm has been to put it off until the patient is in advanced terminal disease when it is, indeed, more difficult to discuss. Studies have also shown that the majority of patients said they would choose to forego futile care but few are presented with this option.

The failure to have this conversation at an appropriate time may end up having the patient frightened and confused and unable to have a meaningful discussion after being fully and intelligently informed about the risks of further treatment and the progression of their illness and the physicians frightened to raise the subject late in the game and give their patient the impression that he or she is being giving up on.

Legislation was proposed in recent Health Reform bills requiring physicians to “offer” to discuss advanced health care planning was met with chants of “Death Panels” in the media partly as a result of prior vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s claim’s of “Death Panels.” She based this on President Obama’s choice for Chair of the NIH Department of Bioethics and concurrent, and seeming conflicting position, as White House Office of Management and Budget - Ezekiel Emanuel. Emanuel has forthrightly stated that young children and elderly should not receive basic health care, not only in times of epidemics or pandemics but in general as it applies to scarce medical (economic) resources. This was easy fodder for Palin’s accusations of death panels in proposed health reform legislation.

In the JAMA article Drs. Terri Fried and Margaret Drickamer; argue for public health announcements to urge advance care planning.

“Delivering these messages will require broad outreach,such as through the use of public service announcements.…Although the process of personal participation in ACP should take place on the clinical level with an individualized interaction between patient and clinician, the process of encouraging participation in ACP must occur on the population level

This will be difficult especially t this time because of recent increased mistrust of government proposals. In my view the trust exists between physicians and their patients and thus the answer lies in vigorous efforts to educate medical students and physicians in the need for, and the methods of discussing advanced care planning at an appropriate time. 

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New Reform Medical Center

Serving your Community since 2010

Agreement and Release

As you enter this Hospital you understand, acknowledge and agree that this hospital rations medical care and services. This means that the hospital and physicians can determine that you may not be entitled to certain medical treatment, even if it is of benefit to you. Your physicians and hospital may conclude that medical costs to the community outweigh the benefits of the otherwise beneficial medical treatment for you, if one or more of the following criteria exist:

Age, (younger than 5 or older than 68);

Mental Abilities, (e.g., Dementia, Parkinson's disease, Schizophrenia);

Economic status, e.g., having exhausted all savings and home equity;

Your ability to contribute to the community in the future;

Non-existence of family and friends to object to our withholding medical treatments;

Other factors unique to you, personally.

Your understanding and acceptance of this agreement will benefit others of your fellow citizens through savings of scarce medical resources. Thank you for making medical care assessable for others.

I, (Patient’s Name) hereby release this hospital and any and all physicians who may participate in my medical care from any and all claims of negligence or wrongdoing of any kind.

Ezekiel Emanuel, M.D.

National Chief of Medical Reform

Dated:                                                                        _______________________________

                                                                                  Patient/Power of Attorney/Surrogate

Approved by the US Government and Consensus Entities

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In Bioethics we learn that the patient has a right to make autonomous decisions. There has, however, been a bias built into to applicable legislation in many states, which interprets “autonomy” as the dignity to refuse treatment and avoid what is termed a protracted death. This slant on autonomy and the right to refuse treatment can cause some patients to be fearful of having an advanced directive, or, cause death due to withholding of artificial life support when not intended or requested by the patient.

It is not, the job of Bioethicists to emphasize the right to refuse treatment, but instead the right to deliberate after being fully informed on all important issues risks, alternative methods of treatment, and quality of life expectations.

Similarly, it is not the job of a Bioethicist to assist in effectuating the perspective or opinion of a patient’s physician, but rather to educate the physician during times of conflict as to the applicable ethical precepts and legal requirements.

We use the word “autonomy” not as a conclusion, but as a starting of point, not to merely ask the patient what they want to do, or a surrogate decision maker what they think the patient would see as best, but to begin a process of communication including all consulting opinions and discussions of cultural and religious and personal beliefs about morality, human rights and fundamental ethical treatment and respect for the patient. This is where we may find what is really meant by the word dignity.

So, autonomy is a concept intended to inform our approach to the patient as well as a basis to confidently respect a patient’s perception of their own life. It is critical for us to understand the ability to proceed and understand, and the actual potential of deliberating on medical decisions by a patient. These issues must be sorted out, not assumed. The degree of explanation to a patient, and the duties of the patient’s physician, changes with each patient, the unique effects of the disease or illness in terms of the patient’s experience and quality of life. Issues of undue influence must a part of our consideration, including pressures from family and financial motivations on the part of utilization reviews and the like.

How do we educate the patient’s surrogates in their acceptable role and duties?

When should we decline to follow the apparent wishes of the patient, or the stated desires of the family?

When is it appropriate to exercise what is known as the “therapeutic privilege” and turn to a more paternalistic approach to patient care?

Each of these questions may open up a Pandora's box of problems, but nevertheless must be confronted with the assistance of Bioethics consultations, mediations, and assistance from appropriate consulting physicians.

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This is the kind of case that courts dread. Baby RM has congenital myasthenic syndrome (CMS) and is on a respirator. The physician supports the mother’s request to terminally extubate. The father implores to the contrary. To make a decision the court must hear evidence, the kind of that will provide a clear picture of this child’s diagnosis and most importantly prognosis - short term and long term.

Before the court can make a ruling this dilemma is best brought before the hospital ethics committee to review this case in detail, hearing from any physicians who are most familiar with this child’s problems, for example, pediatric pulmonology, pediatric neurology and physical therapy who could possibly work with this child – or not. The ethics committee would properly be composed of physicians from a variety of medical specialties, lawyers, lay people and clergy. 

Thereafter, a written explanation and recommendation would be provided. Quality of life at present does not necessarily reflect the probable quality of life in the future. This ethics committee process is designed to confront severe dilemmas in medicine with the experience of having done so numerous times before, should be of great assistance, both to this child’s physician, parents as well as the court - if still necessary.

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Transparency:

The salient ethical, moral and principle necessity to terminal extubation is the transparency of the conduct of all physicians and medical staff, and fundamental understanding by the patient family and or friends as to why it is being done and how it is being done. It is therefore the obligation of the primary treating physician (PMD) to assure full communication and full documentation.

All must keep in mind that the critical distinguishing factor between terminal extubation and physicians assisted suicide is the patient’s rejection (by the patient of patient's surrogate) of artificial life sustaining treatment followed by the alleviation of pain and discomfort of the dying patient. Unambiguous documentation must avoid any appearance of physician assisted suicide. Only by being forthright about these factors can real transparency exist. 

It is the fundamental right of all patients to reject medical treatment after all risks have been explained and all options presented. It is this rejection of treatment by a patient that distinguishes the act of caring for the patient from assisting in a patient’s suicide. The principle of the “double effect” in the use of elevating doses of opioids that may depress the respiratory system that is intended to diminish or alleviate the patient’s pain is not considered assisting the patient to end their life. Although ordering of opioids may hasten death it is the intention of alleviating pain after and only after, the patient’s refusal of life sustaining treatment. After a patient is extubated, the goal of medical care must shift to the treatment of symptoms.

Families will receive complete explanations that death will occur after an unknown period of time after extubation. Whether a family should be present during terminal extubation may depend upon their complete understanding and acceptance of the act and its consequences. It is generally best to have family and friends leave the room at the time of extubation.

Protocol:

1.            Terminal extubation can only be performed after a collective decision-making process. It should be discussed by a group, for example, Primary Treating Physician and any of the following; Consulting Pulmonologist; Respiratory Therapist; Bioethicist; Nursing Director of Critical Care; and Critical Care Nurses involved in the patient’s care.

2.            If possible, at least a 24-hours period should pass from the time of the decision to the time of extubation. If a surrogate has made the decision, the surrogate must review, understand, sign and have witnessed a Form for Withdrawal of Treatment. It is wise to offer the opportunity for the surrogate decision maker to meet with clergy. In light of the recent case law it is appropriate to ask the surrogate decision maker if there is someone in the family who is objecting to the terminal extubation. This will serve to protect the patient life as well as the physicians and hospital from potential liability for terminally extubation of the patient when a family member is objecting. If this cannot be worked out court assistance may be necessary for the protection of all concerned. (A sample form is included below).

3.            The PMD should personally perform or supervise terminal extubation. Involvement of the PMD reflects the importance of end-of-life care and sensitivity to the family. Terminal extubation therefore should not be seen or conducted as an everyday medical procedure. The PMD must be sensitive in providing any cultural or spiritual factors needed to allow the utmost respect and dignity to the patient, family and friends.

4.            NOTE: Patients who are in a minimally conscious state or have a non-terminal illness will require the Ethics Committee to meet and confer directly with the PMD and relevant consultants and review all necessary medical records before a decision to terminally extubate may be made. In this regard the PMD and Ethics Committee must determine that there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient would reject artificial life sustaining treatment under the medical circumstances existent at that time. All family and friends who can be reasonably located will receive notice of the intent to terminally extubate and given at least 24 hours to object. If there is any objection, risk management and legal counsel will be consulted immediately. 

Notification of Death

Notification of death should be delivered in person, whenever possible by the PMD. The family frequently must be contacted by telephone if they are not present at the time of death. Family notification may be accomplished by any physician or nursing staff and should be documented.

 For an excellent discussion, see: http://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla%3Aen-US%3Aofficial&channel=s&hl=en&source=hp&q=www.ethics.va.gov%2F...%2FNET_Topic_20050330_Terminal_Extubation.doc&btnG=Google+Search

Bernard W Freedman, Bioethicist

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The Los Angeles Daily News, July 11, 2009, wrote, “One doctor, who chairs the Northridge Hospital Ethics Committee, did raise the important and relevant issue of excessive, costly, end-of-life care that has no potential for significantly extending life. If consumers had to pay a significant copayment, they might not demand unreasonable or unadvisable care."

http://www.dailynews.com/editorial/ci_12817975

If this physician actually said this, of which I am doubtful, then it must be pointed out that a decision to terminate life sustaining treatment based on or informed by economic considerations is unethical and of great concern. Discussions of terminating life sustaining treatment must be grounded in evidence of the patent's intent, degree of suffering, quality of life, etc., but certainly not by demanding payment from people to persuade them to stop medical treatment and die.

Bioethics deals with the application of ethical and legal principles in medicine, not economic expediency. Physicians, and ethics committees across the nation struggle to understand each patients needs and wishes: what dignity means to them,– their religious, ethnic and racial points of view - their fears, mistrust and sometimes misplaced trust which may result from the undue influence of family, friends, business associates and others. As the California Court of Appeals wrote: “…the decision must ultimately belong to the one whose life is in issue.”

There are many people who appropriately face the economic realities of everyday hospital services. Reducing medical costs, oversight of physician owned hospitals who often generate higher costs due to the ordering of tests which have an economic benefit for the physicians ordering the tests, defensive medicine, reducing medical errors that result in serious injury and run up unnecessary medical costs, sometimes for patients who will need specialized medical care for the rest of their lives.

But, it is not for the chair of an ethics committee to declare what life is worthy of receiving life sustaining care based upon economic principles. Physicians and ethics committees must deal with the individual patient, one patient at a time.

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A South Korean Ethics Committee uses a staged approach to Withdrawing Life Support

In follow up to this blog’s April 23, 2009 post: “Letting the Conscious But Incompetent, Non Terminally Ill, Patient Die.” A South Korean hospital used a staged approach to consider the withdrawal of artificial life support based upon the condition of the patient.

On June 11, 2009 an Ethics Committee at the Yonsei University Severance Hospital in Seoul Korea decided to remove a 77-year-old woman in a vegetative state from a respirator in accordance with a Supreme Court ruling. 

Severance Hospital President Park Chang-il said:

   

“Though we should comply with the Supreme Court ruling, the patient is not facing impending death. So after conducting several meetings, we made the decision,” … “Under the three-stage guideline for death with dignity we came up with, we will make a prudent decision for patients who are in the second stage like the patient in question.”

Stage 1: patients facing impending death due to irrecoverable diseases such as brain death or impairment of multiple organs.
Stage 2: Patients in a vegetative state on respirators.
Stage 3: Patients able to breathe on their own.

Life support for patients in the first and second stages will be removed when certain criteria are clear such as patient self-determination, family consent and the ethics committee’s conditions are met.

In the light of the case discussed in the April 23 post, ethics committee should be required to pursue, with greater scrutiny depending upon the cognitive level and medical condition of the patient. It is unlikely that the ethics committee in Seoul would have approved of discharging a conscious but incompetent, non-terminally ill patient and resultant death.

Remember: The greater the cognitive and medical condition of a patient, the greater the level of scrutiny that is required before life sustaining treatment can be withheld or withdrawn. The greater the ambiguity the more need there is to err on the side of protecting the patient and to err on the side of life. Such an effort serves to protect the life of the patient and protect physicians and hospitals from potential liability.

 

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I agree with the court’s rulings in the case of Daniel Hauser, highlighted in the media recently. In this case there is as absolute need to continue chemotherapy. It should however be pointed out that the Court ignored Mrs. Hauser’s demand for confidentiality and contributed to this case becoming a spectacle in the media and making Mrs. Hauser the focus of overwhelming media attention, pitting her beliefs against most of the country's. This injudicious conduct may have contributed to the panic of the mother to leave the jurisdiction and hide herself and her son.

The legal issues in this case are, as noted by Arthur Kaplan, from the University of Pennsylvania, on Anderson Cooper's program, are easy. Dr. Kaplan also noted that in many cases psychologists come on board and are generally successful in swaying the family and the minor patient toward recommended treatment. People struggle with medical decisions to withdraw and withhold medical care each day. Many of these dilemmas deal with children. Irrespective of the religious beliefs of the parents this child would nevertheless be required to undergo chemo therapy over the objections of the parents. If the parents were members of the Church of Christ - Christian Science or Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Jehovah's Witnesses - the same legal and ethical issues would have to be confronted.

Patients and their physician, family and friends need to feel free to turn to the court for assistance in controversies surrounding withdrawing and withholding medical care without fear of becoming involved in a media circus.

In this instance the parents adhered to beliefs of a Native American religion.Judge Rodenberg, without any legitimate connection with the legal issues presented, chose to publish his confidential question and answer cross examination of Daniel Hauser, on the court's web site, including inquiry about a Native American religion. This would not have occurred with other more traditionally recognized religions. There is no religious justification to withhold life saving treatment from a minor and the Judge had no legitiamate reason to make it a focus of inquiry.

The Judge ignored Daniel Hauser's right as a minor to confidentiality and this testimony should never have been published.

Daniel Hauser's physicians ignored their bioethical duties to utilize the services of a clinical bioethicist, a psychiatrist or psychologist to intervene and assist in facilitating the exchange of information regarding different treatments and the effectiveness, risk and effect on quality of life of these treatments verses the failing to treat.

If the testimony of Daniel Hauser is accurate, his personal physician never actually sat down with him and established a line of communication  and did not engender a sense of trust.

P 25 of Daniel’s testimony:
Q.  So he [Dr. Bostrom] did not actually tell you, you had cancer?
A.  Right.

Q.  Okay, so you learned of that from your mother?
A.  Right.
…
Q.  So you and Dr. Bostrom never talked to you like I am talking to you right now?
A.  No.

Daniel was able to understand the purpose of his biopsy procedure, the necessity of determining and distinguishing types of cancer, the need for an ultrasound and that ultrasound reflected the possibility of a pulmonary embolism, which could lead to his death.  

Page 39:
Q.  There was a problem with your left arm at some point?
A.  If I moved my arm too much or jerked it, it could break off and go to the heart and I could have a heart attack.

Q.  Did someone tell you that?
A.  Yeah, the nurse did... I think they did an ultrasound or something……… I think (my arm) was warm…they found it was a clot and they said that could cause problems if it broke loose?

So, after one time of chemotherapy he experienced significant illness, weakness, and was caused to fear for his life.  The judge did not directly ask him nor did he indicate any conversation with his physicians in which he was told that his life depended on him receiving continued chemotherapy.

Notwithstanding his age and his inability to legally consent or refuse treatment, a 13-year-old patient should be told, on a level that he can understand, of the ramifications and risks of accepting or refusing therapy.

Medical Confidentiality:

On the issue of the medical confidentiality Daniel was entitled to have his medical care and medical history kept confidential.  Notwithstanding his mother and/or father’s refusal of treatment, Daniel, through his mother demanded confidentiality. Mrs. Hauser specifically asked the judge to maintain confidentiality for her son.  

Page: 60.  Mrs. Hauser asked the court for a private conversation.

Mrs. Hauser’s demand: “I do not want this out of this room, okay?”

Judge Rodenberg responded:

“Well although you need to be mindful… my plan was to file a copy of the [Daniel’s testimony and medical information] … because – just so you are understanding, the public has a [page 61] legitimate interest in knowing what happened here today.”

The public, because of media attention, may be interested in a lot of things, yet, that does not mean that a patient loses his right to keep his medical care confidential. There is no evidence that Daniel Hauser ever put himself into the “public arena” and waived any confidentiality with respect to his personal life and/or medical care. Confidentiality should have been maintained.

If the court views that disclosure of information is necessary, than historically, the full name of the patient is kept confidential and the case is referred to as, for example, In re Daniel H.

For the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Rehnquist wrote:

It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its proceedings have been conducted outside . . . the public’s full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity. (Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2671, 61L. Ed. 2d 399 (1979).

In West Virginia for example, in a case involving education records, the state Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the public policy of protecting the confidentiality of juvenile information in all court proceedings:  
    
"we are loathe to allow one of the last bastions of privacy, juvenile confidentiality, to be diminished in the least bit,"

 Unfortunately, normal and customary procedures for dealing with ethical issues in the medical community were not utilized and basic law protecting a child’s right of confidentiality were cast aside.



Bernard W. Freedman, JD, MPH


 

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HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE CHAPTER 166.039.

PROCEDURE WHEN PERSON HAS NOT EXECUTED OR ISSUED A DIRECTIVE AND IS INCOMPETENT OR INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATION

For the most vulnerable patients, without friends or family, life for some medical patients in Texas, is cheap.  On vague and specious grounds and without proper oversight or transparency, physicians may withdraw life sustaining treatment from a patient, even if the patient is conscious, talking, and aware of his or her surroundings. This statute allows this to occur if a physician treating the patient concludes that the patient will die within six months and there is no advance health directive to the contrary.

There is a fundamental liberty interest which permits a patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment. There is also a fundamental constitutional right, which each person has, to his or her life.  This right is protected by the due process clause. Yet, Texas law makes a presumption that leads to an unjustified decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment. The statute declares that merely because a patient has not filled out or written an advance health directive does not mean they don’t want to die.  So, under Texas law, a conscious, but incompetent patient will be allowed to die if a physician, with “reasonable” medical judgment decodes that the patient will die within six months. “Reasonable” medical judgment is a low standard for the death of a patient. It does not require a "probability of death" with 6 months – only a reasonable and unchecked judgment. Moreover, the available safeguards which would require the review by a hospital ethics committee, or a court of law, is not a hurdle that is required to be cleared before removing the patient from life sustaining care. As long as there is no advanced health directive, and no family or friend to object, a physician can order the cessation of life support, if a non-treating physician or a member of the ethics committee agrees. Nor is there any effort or requirement of due diligence that must be made to locate friends or family.

In looking at this statutory scheme we should keep in mind the words of another Texan:

           "You do not examine legislation in the light of the benefits it will convey if properly administered,but in the light of the wrongs it would do and the harms it would cause if improperly administered."
Lyndon B. Johnson

A conscious competent patient (with a terminal illness) who asks for help to end suffering may not be helped by their physician to end her life. This is considered physician-assisted suicide and is prohibited by law.  However, under Texas law, a conscious patient who cannot decide for him or herself, and therefore needs the utmost protection, can have life-sustaining treatment independently halted by their physician and die without violating the patient’s constitutionally protected right to life. To overcome a fundamental constitutional right a full and comprehensive review of all relevant facts, opinions, motivation, bias, undue influence, is guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Why were these safeguards unconstitutionally cast aside by the Texas legislature?

It is clear that the right of a patient to withhold or withdraw from any treatment, including life sustaining treatment, is predicated on a legal tradition protecting the autonomous decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. However, we must be careful to make the distinction that the right to refuse treatment is the patient’s right, not the right of a physician or hospital, or legislature. A presumption that the patient would choose death rather than life seems to be founded on a legislatively created principle that people, without known friends or family, rights can be disregarded and that the economic interest of the state is sufficient to overcome life. The Texas law that permits a casual and unregulated state imposed medical decision making scheme is unconstitutional.

In most circumstances, there are no specific statistical data on death from a specific disease within six months.  When there are one or more studies, they are based upon information gathered from different medical communities with different demographics . The data will vary based on the age, type, and extent of disease and with different accompanying disease processes.  Nevertheless, this statue presumes that a physician, irrespective of her specialty, is aware of all studies, and that all studies are based on relevant and sound epidemiological principles, and sufficiently powered biostatistical results.

In this way, patients are left to the creative medical imaginations and empirical and anecdotal experience. which will vary between physicians, that will determine a decision of life or death. 

Review by the entire ethics committee, with a written explanation, must be legally mandated. There is, at present, a Bill in the Texas Legislature to amend  this statute, Section 166.039. A requirement for mandatory ethics committee review should be included.

The Texas statute’s 6-month standard is illusory and prone to ethnic, racial, socioeconomic status and age bias. This, more often then not, will be a member of a minority group, whose family and/or friends cannot be located, or the patient is simply alone. So, the statute targets the most vulnerable patients who need the highest level of protection.

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It must not be too easy to withhold life sustaining treatment from any patient. When it comes to a conscious patient, who is not suffering from a terminal illness, we have to be unquestionably sure we know what we are doing.
    
A consulting physician contacted me expressing great concern that a 60 year old female patient who would likely die without surgery was being discharged. He said, “The patient is not terminal and is treatable. She needs surgery to survive – probably amputation of one or both lower extremities. The family wants her to be discharged home for hospice care and be allowed to pass away comfortably. The primary treating physician agrees with the family that this is best for her. This is not right.”

The primary treating physician explained to me that he had been caring for this patient for many years. She has little understanding of her underlying disease.  Her affect is flat.  He thinks that she has complete occlusion of both popliteal arteries, gangrene, and will need an amputation of the left and possible the right leg.  She has well-controlled diabetes; and recurrent VRE infections. She has bilateral pneumonia and bacteremia. She does not have the capacity to make her own medical decisions. The family wants her to be discharged home under hospice care and allowed to die comfortably.

I interviewed the patient and asked if she wanted to go home: she said “yes.” I asked her if she understood that she would most likely need to have an amputation of one or both of her legs if she was to survive. She said, ” if it is needed so I do not die – yes, I want that.”  I asked her questions about her life and family. She answered all questions appropriately, albeit with a slow response and little emotion. Her son, the surrogate decision maker, felt that she would refuse further treatment “if she understood things.”

I urged a psychiatric (was she suffering from a major depressive disorder, negative or positive family experiences, expectations of family vis a vis her illness) and neurologic consult (was she suffering from some transient mental confusion, was any medication she was taking impacting her ability to communicate or consider her options, would waiting help?)  be ordered. A consulting physician asked for an infectious disease consult. (was she suffering from metabolic encephalopathy accounting for her flat affect etc.). Thereafter a bioethics meeting could be arranged to consider all opinions to gain a overall understanding of her cognitive state. Physicians could ask questions of the family and vice versa.

A psychiatrist determined that the patient did not understand the nature and risks of her medical condition and therefore lacked capacity to make any decisions. Accordingly, her request for the surgery could be disregarded.  I discussed with him the fact that she was a non terminal patient who was conscious and responding to questions. He responded that the patient’s son's demands for discharge without further care were “perfectly reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances” as her care would be an incredible burden on the family.

The primary treating physician agreed, explaining that he was overwhelmed with the complex and unrelenting medical problems that this patient had endured. It was clear to me that he cared deeply for this patient and had struggled desperately in treating her over the years.  No further consults were ordered and the patient was summarily released from the hospital within moments of the conclusion of the psychiatric evaluation, without any further dialogue.

Ethical issues & Legal requirements:

Case law, legislation, bioethics protocols and literature have grappled, for many years now, over how best approach terminating or withholding life sustaining treatment. Most cases have confronted situations where a patient is in a persistent vegetative state, or a terminally ill patient who could avoid needless suffering and prolongation of the process of death. For example, the California legislature passed into law §4650 of the Probate Code, declaring that “…The prolongation of the process of dying for a person for whom continued health care does not improve the prognosis for recovery may violate patient dignity, and cause unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial.”

In the conscious but incompetent, non terminally ill patient, however, these concerns do not apply. Nor are there any concerns here regarding demands for treatments that are medically futile. So, what are the ethical and legal issues presented in this scenario? A “best interest” criteria seems inapposite.  We cannot ethically conclude that this patient’s best interests are served by allowing her to die. It may be seen as beneficial to her family to avoid the burden of physically and financially caring for her. Considerations of burden on families are important and relevant, but not a justification for death due to lack of treatment.

The basis for an autonomous refusal of further treatment requires a sufficient showing, at the least,  that the patient has a clear and comprehensive informed consent, as well as time for reflection and deliberation, while understanding that death will likely follow if treatment is stopped. Case law refers to this level of proof in this situation as “clear and convincing evidence.” There, however, is no showing here that this patient would, if “satisfactorily” competent, refuse treatment. The psychiatric exam that concluded that the patient did not understand the nature of her disease process and the risks of treatment (and non treatment), did not establish anything of value. Yet, this brief, psychiatric exam  was sufficient enough to allow this patient, over my strenuous objections and pleas to stop, to be put on a gurney and wheeled out of the hospital by her son within moments of the psychiatric exam, and with out a neurologic and infectious disease evaluation. This patient understood that if she did not have surgery she would die, and that she would require one or both of her legs amputated. She understood that and asked for surgery so she could live.  What more must be required of her?

The California Supreme Court, in the case of Conservatorship of Wendland, required a showing by a conservator, of "clear and convincing evidence" that an incompetent, non terminal patient, would want to die, before life sustaining treatment could be withdrawn.

The lesson of this post, and the point to remember, is that the greater the cognitive and medical condition of a patient, the greater the level of scrutiny that is required before life sustaining treatment can be withheld or withdrawn.  We can look at this by considering six basic categories of the condition of a patient:

1.    Terminal and Persistent Vegetative State (PVS);
2.    Terminal and Minimally Conscious;
3.    Terminal and Conscious;
4.    Non Terminal and PVS
5.    Non Terminal, and Minimally Conscious;
6.    Non Terminal, and Conscious    

At each level, our degree of concern and the absolute necessity to delve further into the medical, personal, ethical and legal bases for the decision must escalate.  Primary treating physicians have help available to properly and earnestly accomplish this. Consulting physicians, clinical bioethicists, hospital ethics committees, and if necessary, courts of law, are available to achieve an ethical, legal and life and death determination.

The greater the ambiguity the more need there is to err on the side of protecting the patient and to err on the side of life. Such an effort serves to protect the life of the patient and protect physicians and hospitals from potential liability.

 

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In 1996, Pfizer needed a randomized trial for a new broad spectrum antibiotic and sent a team of its doctors into the Nigerian slum City of Kano during a meningitis epidemic. It was represented, to be a "humanitarian mission.”

A team of Pfizer doctors arrived at the Nigerian camp where meningitis had killed at least 11,000 people.  They set up near a medical station run by Doctors Without Borders who were providing standard treatment. At the Kano Infectious Diseases Hospital, 200 sick children were picked. Half were given doses of the experimental Pfizer drug called Trovan and the others were treated with an established antibiotic.

Eleven of the children died and many more, it is alleged, suffered serious side effects ranging from organ failure to brain damage. After two weeks Pfizer summarily left the camp. Pfizer denies these allegations. The company claims only five children died after taking Trovan and six died after receiving injections of the certified drug Rocephin, (ceftriaxone). It is alleged that parents were not told that their children were to receive an experimental drug. It is reported, by Pfizer, that consent was obtained from the Nigerian state and produced a letter of permission from a Kano ethics committee which was a document that was alleged to have been a backdated form approved by the committee for a medical trial performed one year after this incident. 

Certainly, such conduct raises serious ethical questions, which reportedly targeted Pfizer with civil and criminal actions. In December 2000, the Washington Post published a lengthy examination of the trial. The Washington Post similarly found that Pfizer carried out the experiment on 200 children at a makeshift epidemic camp in the northern Nigerian town of Kano. The articles reported that Pfizer had no signed consent forms for the children and relied on a falsified ethics approval letter to defend the design of the experiment. 

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, regarding Pfizer’s conduct,  that "the administration of drug trials without informed consent on the scale alleged in the complaints poses a real threat to international peace and security…and  "fosters distrust and resistance to international drug trials, cutting-edge medical innovation, and critical international public health initiatives in which pharmaceutical companies play a key role. ... As this case illustrates, the failure to secure consent for human experimentation has the potential to generate substantial anti-American animus and hostility."

Comment:

The fundamental ethical predicate in randomized clinical trials is that, based upon the state of knowledge at the time, it does not establish that either arm of the trial is superior to the other.  This is generally referred to as “equipoise” without which a randomized clinical trial may not ethically go forward. To administer an experimental drug to children with meningitis when an effective proven medication is available, needlessly and purposefully exposes patients to serious injury or death.

The attempt to avoid the legal protections for patients in the United States by carrying out randomized clinical trials in Africa, is particularly damning. We should, however, keep in mind that related problems exist in pediatric oncology Phase I Trials in the United States. Phase II and III trials analyze benefits and compare results to standard treatments. Phase I studies do not. They are, simply stated, experiments with no legitimate expectation of benefit to the research subject. In order to permit a child’s participation in a Phase I trial the law requires an informed consent to the parents or guardian. ( It is not legally clear whether a parent or guardian can consent to exposing their child to unnecessarily harmful experimentation.) Telling them about risks, however, does not discharge that requirement. It is an informed consent that must be obtained, not merely offered. It must be presented to the child and parents in an unbiased way, and it must also be comprehended. Neither research physicians nor the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) have been effective in accomplishing this task.

The tendency of research subjects to confuse their participation in clinical trials with personalized medical care is commonplace. There is an inherent conflict of interest between research physicians and child research subjects due to a misconception that treatment will be provided. This conflict may be most severe when it involves pediatric cancer patients and their parents. Children suffering from a terminal illness, whose quality of life may be eroded by pursuing hopes for survival in a phase I drug trial, where no real hope exists, need rigorous protection. Their perspective is not only a product of hope but also the result of repeated and purposeful misrepresentations by researchers and university medical centers that research subjects in phase I drug trials will receive “treatment.” Experimental toxicity studies however are not treatment. This misrepresentation has often been referred to as a “therapeutic misconception.”  

For many people a university medical center inspires a sense of awe and can engender their confidence and trust. This may account, in part, for a child’s or parent’s belief that there will be some benefit in participating in a Phase I trial.  There is a tendency in the recruitment process in Phase I trials to exploit this trust.

In a study published in the Journal of  Oncology (Perceptions of Patients and Physicians Regarding Phase I Cancer Clinical Trials: Implications for Physician-Patient Communication, three hundred twenty-eight patients and 48 physicians completed surveys regarding expectations regarding treatment outcomes. Although 95% of patients reported that quality of life was at least as important as length of life, only 28% reported that changes in quality of life with treatment were discussed with  physicians. In contrast, 73% of physicians reported that this topic was discussed.  As to risks of the Phase I trial, 91.5% of the physicians believed that they discussed the risks, while only 73% of the patients recalled discussing of risk.

Discordance Between Patients and Physicians About Consultation Content
                                                                              Physician       Patient     
Discussion Topic                                                   No.     %         No.     %             P*
Changes in quality of life with treatment              171     73.4      65      27.9     < .0001
Changes in length of life with treatment               140     59.6     69      29.4     < .0001
Changes in quality of life without treatment         145     62.5      67     28.9     < .0001
Changes in length of life without treatment          123     52.8      67     28.8     < .0001
Possible side effects from treatment                     217     92.0   184     78.0     < .0001
Possible benefits from treatment                           212     90.2    185     78.8     < .0001
Possible risks from treatment                                214     91.5    170     72.7     < .0001
*McNemar’s test.    

It is important to note that the word “treatment” is used with respect to a Phase I clinical trials. Yet, a Phase I Clinical Trial is not “treatment” it is experimental testing which, hopefully, will lead to a treatment.

IRBs are required by statute to determine, without any specific guidelines to help them, that there are adequate provisions for “…monitoring the data collected to ensure the safety of subjects."  Yet, no monitoring is generally done by IRBs. The President’s Council for Bioethics found that:

" Amazingly, no one - not the director of NIH, the commissioner of the FDA, or a representative of the Pharmaceutical Researcher and Manufacturers of America - knows how many people participate in biomedical or other research studies in the United States each year. … no comprehensive data exist on specific aspects of research. No one can say how many research participants suffer serious, unexpected adverse events each year, either for a specific study or in general, and of those, how many sustain a permanent disability or die unexpectedly. "

The problem is perhaps best described by the Chairman of the Council, Leon Kass who, in his discussion with the panel of the President’s Council, raised the issue of simply being honest with research subjects:    

"If one simply says ‘they are the only subjects that are possibly available to advance our knowledge,’ however truly necessary that it is as a condition for using them, the question is whether it’s sufficient and whether one doesn’t want to try some kind of honest way to elicit their identification with the enterprise and not simply exploit their desperation.  It’s not an objection to proceeding with the research, but the question is:  How should they be regarded?  How should they be treated?  How should they be spoken to?"

  Hence, we must not labor under the misperception that lack of candidness and legitimate informed consent in clinical trials is limited to villages in Africa. Problems exist in the United States and must be seen as work for clinical bioethicists to improve the process of informed consent in Phase I trials, especially with children, and to put in place protocols to expose conflicts of interests.

 

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Advance Health Directive:

Patient has an advanced health directive, witnessed, notarized and in the format of a legal document done by his attorney, rejecting treatment if he has a terminal condition with the probability of death within a few months; and/or an irreversible condition requiring artificial life support. Patient’s daughter is designated as surrogate. The document is notarized.
This 84 year old man is admitted for pneumonia; dementia; depression; anemia; malnutrition; renal failure, and hypernaturemia.

History: Dysphasia, anorexia, ataxia, poor intake, altered level of consciousness, restless, hypotensive, shortness of breath, bilateral rales. He is unable to give any history himself.

Admitting: Diagnosis: Acute pneumonia on top of interstitial lung disease and bronchiectasis.
The patient is intubated and noted to have renal failure, thrombocytopenia, leukocytosis, anemia, and deteriorating mental condition.

Patient’s daughter advises that her father never wanted to be maintained on artificial life support. Options are discussed with daughter, who requests that a do not resuscitate order be instituted.
Daughter advises bioethics consultant that she is waiting to hear from doctors regarding their opinion as to whether or not the pulmonary condition is irreversible, as described in the advance health directive. If so she wants to refuse continued artificial ventilation. Pending the receipt of that information she requests that no tracheostomy be performed. She insists that the patient not be sent to a skilled nursing facility.

Nevertheless, it is recommended, and the daughter consents to a tracheostomy. Daughter has not, however, been told any opinion as to irreversibility of respiratory failure. Attempt at weaning is ordered and patient is extubated. He deteriorates and is reintubated the same day. Pulmonologist, without consulting patient's daughter, writes order that patient be transferred to a skilled nursing facility.

Daughter is advised by nurse about the transfer order and refuses transfer. She reiterates that her father would not want to live in a skilled nursing facility on artificial life support. Under these circumstances he would reject continued artificial ventilation. Daughter says she does not want futile care. Patient’s daughter, and bioethics consult request a meeting with pulmonologist. There is no response from pulmonologist, one-way or the other.

The pulmonologist ceases to participate in case without any discussion with daughter. Daughter requests and signs withdrawal of artificial ventilation form. Three days later the daughter is notified that her father has been extubated and transferred to a skilled nursing facility. She, however, is unable to locate her father at that facility and is told that her father "never arrived." She calls the hospital and is told that he is no longer a patient at that hospital. She thereafter discovers, through the nursing administration office, that her father has died and that his body has been in the hospital's morgue for 3 days.

Comments:

1.    Physicians as well as patients and family often have difficulty withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. The daughter never received an answer as to the probability of death or of the irreversibility of the patient’s condition - the criteria set forth in the advance health directive. Her decisions were not informed.She felt abandoned by the pulmonologist who seemed to "just disappear."

2.    There is no obligation for a physician to treat a patient in a way that is contrary to the physician’s conscience. A physician does have the obligation, however, to inform a patient, or if necessary a surrogate decision maker, as to the diagnosis and prognosis, including risks of treatment and of non treatment. Before signing off the case the pulmonologist, should have and easily could have advised the daughter that he was withdrawing from the case and discuss options, which should have included arranging for a new pulmonologist on the case.

3.    There is reluctance on the part of many physicians to discuss end of life care and options. An Institute of Medicine study on improving care at the end of life found that there is often:
a) Overuse of care that is inconsistent with patient preferences and prognosis;
b) Underuse of care to treat symptoms;
             c) Untimely referral to hospice;
             d) Poor palliative care;
             e) Poor communication regarding prognosis and treatment preferences.

In a cohort study of 1573 patients, prolonged ventilation was not generally discussed:
         12% of patients discussed preferences with their physicians,
         20% said that they wanted it,
         80% said that they did not want it.
Annals of Internal Medicine: 1 July 1997 | Volume 127 Issue 1 | Pages 1-12

4.    After withdrawal or withholding artificial life support, the need for palliative care must be conscientiously provided to patient and/or surrogate decision makers. Responsibility for patient care does not end with a decision to withdraw artificial life support.

5.    Support for family members should continue. This case illustrates that physicians can lose interest in a patient after a decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment.  In this instance this may have contributed to the failure to maintain a line of communication with this patient’s daughter, including advising her of her father’s death.


 

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The patient, Larry M, is a man in his 40s with a wife and three children at his bedside. He is in end stage liver cancer. He has been receiving total parenteral nutrition and IV fluids and has now decided to have his feeding tube and IV fluids withdrawn and to then return home with his wife and children, and with the assistance of hospice, die as comfortably as possible. The patient feels that this is be best for him and helpful to his wife and children to go through this process with him. His physicians fully support this decision.

Before leaving the hospital, however, the patient’s sister flies in from out of state, distraught, angry, and out of control. She cannot accept that her brother is “going to give up.”  She vehemently expresses her disdain for the physicians and for her sister-in-law’s support of her brother’s decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration and leave the hospital.  In the hospital room, sister begins to yell and throw chairs around the room.  The nurse calls security. The patient requests that his sister not be escorted out of the room, and sister agrees to “calm down.”  The sister, however, continues to subject the patient’s wife to verbal abuse. The patient does not want to expose his wife to this abuse, and is concerned that after his death there will be alienation of his wife and children from the rest of the patient’s family.  Accordingly, in order to appease his sister and to protect his wife, the patient agrees to remain in the hospital with continued artificial nutrition and hydration.
The original decision to return home was freely arrived at. His new decision to remain in the hospital is not.  Nevertheless, Larry M has changed his mind based upon factors important to him: namely, his wife and children’s future relations with his family and his sister’s anguish that he, in her eyes, do all he can to survive as long as possible.
It is not the duty of a physician or bioethicist to act as security guards or family councilors.  Bioethicists can mediate the impasse. A bioethicist could privately ask Larry M if he thought it might be helpful if he, and or physician, met with his sister and other family members to discuss the Larry’s terminal medical condition and his right to make unencumbered decisions, and also consider other approaches.

Approaches to consider:
Time is often an important factor. In this instance the patient’s sister has flown in from out of state, probably in a heighten state of panic and fear for her brother. Allowing some time to pass without argument or attempts at persuasion, may allow the sister to cool down to the point of being able to understand the reasons for her brother’s decision.

 
Medicine: Family members living far from the patient have not been a part of the medical care provided or the suffering that patients have endured over the course of their illness.  Apprising them, in some detail, of the long and arduous courses of treatment and make them feel a part of the process and part of the decision making process and enable family members to support the patient wishes and to move from anger and fear for her brother to support and compassion for the patient.
Physicians and nurses may tend to loose interest in patients after withdrawal of aggressive treatment, and may be seen as abandoning the patient. So, physicians and nurses should maintain ongoing and meaningful contact with the patient and family.

In some instances, it has been shown that patients, who would otherwise elect to withdraw from artificial nutrition and hydration, continue to request it in order to satisfy the concerns of family, notwithstanding abdominal discomfort and nausea. Discussions with family and physicians and nurses regarding concerns of withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration are generally helpful to the patient and the family.  

 

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The Vatican and the 2004 President’s Council On Bioethics establishes a second class group of persons who they deem less worthy of dignity and respect.

On September 8, 2008, the Vatican issued a new statement on bioethics entitled “Dignitas Personae on certain bioethical questions.”  The Vatican’s paper updates church doctrine regarding the ethics and morality of individuals and the duties and authority of physicians in using in-vitro fertilization (IVF).  The Vatican has always demanded absolute and unconditional recognition of the respect and dignity owed to all persons from the time of conception.  This does not apply to persons conceived by IVF, who from the time of conception are relegated to a lesser class of personhood.

The Vatican identifies people born through IVF as not entitled to the same respect and dignity as owed to persons conceived without the interference of medical technology that requires any extracorporeal processes. The premise of the church is children be conceived “by the fruit of the conjugal act specific to the love between spouses.” If not so conceived, the person “… must be given a moral evaluation in reference to the dignity of the human person.”

In 2004, the President’s Council on Bioethics expressed an analogous point of view.

  The Council states that a child’s “being” is determined by in-utero sexual conception, without which the child is without an “identity.” This, the Council argues, is because the “character and significance of human procreation … all of the child’s being and identity, it owes to a continuous developmental process that begins with the union of egg and sperm and continues through an unbroken sequence of embryonic and fetal stages and active within the womb of the mother.”  The scientific basis for the Council’s position is that:

“… through the genetic recombination produced by the lottery of sexual reproduction, genetic novelty is assured, allowing for the gradual evolutionary emergence of new biological capacities and possibilities.  Humanly speaking, because these deep biological facts are lifted into human self-consciousness, procreation commonly establishes ties of belonging, rooted in begetting ritually significant for parents, children, and the larger society.”

It is these “ties of belonging, rooted in begetting” that the Council argues, that are the genesis of human worth and a basis to gauge the dignity and human rights to be afforded to such a person. So, the child lacks (does not lose), per the Councils reasoning, from the time of conception, an identity. Genetically we could see it as an agenesis of identity and dignity – and as a result, never belonging to the human community.   The distinction, therefore, is that a child born through normal sexual in utero conception is a child that is “created” while the IVF conceived child is “made.”

The concept of personhood has been struggled with for centuries. For Plato, personhood was the essence of the soul. Later, personhood was discussed in terms of Natural Law and the reflection of a truly unique identity, divinely created individual. Thus, the question: are IVF conceived persons, in the eyes of the Vatican, divinely created? If not, we can surmise from the Vatican’s statements that the unconditional respect and dignity enjoyed by all human beings in the eyes of the Church from the time of conception are not applicable to the IVF conceived child.

Under the Doctrine of Faith, the Vatican makes clear that a physician is not permitted to participate in IVF and interfere with the natural sexual procreation:

“… all techniques for heterologous artificial fertilization as well as those techniques of homologous artificial fertilization which substitute for the conjugal act, are to be excluded.  …, the doctor is at the service of persons and the human procreation.  He does not have the authority to dispose of them or to decide their fate.”

So, in order to accommodate the Vatican’s viewpoint, physicians must cease to perform or participate in IVF, and perhaps refuse to discuss the reproductive options available with their patients.  Following this argument further, physicians of would-be parents would have a moral obligation to refrain from using IVF, both for the sake of would-be parents as well as for the overall good of the community. Should physicians shun or care for IVF conceived persons?

It is of great concern that the Council, a pseudo-governmental organization, would stratify the moral and ethical standing of citizens. The Council’s position seeks to supersede procreative liberty and medical decision making with governmental definition of the qualifications to be human. This is antithetical to principles of a democratic society and to the health, welfare and unbiased treatment of persons born with the assistance of IVF.  

It is reported that there are more than 3 million people conceived with IVF. So, what becomes of these persons without a sense of being or identity? How can one be a moral agent in a community where human origins are graded? Are they to view themselves as neutered in someway because of their noncoital beginnings? Should they be reluctant to pass on to their progeny a genetic makeup that has no true identity? Should persons conceived with IVF be seen as lacking ensoulment? The pronouncements of the Vatican and the Council target all persons born with IVF assistance as well as their progeny-forever.  

In-vitro fertilization
Artificial Reproductive Technology
Dignitas Personae On Certain Bioethical Questions
Dignity
Morality
State Paternalism
Religion and medical decision making
Physicians as moral agents

 

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Being right does not make a decision morally correct.

The patient, a 98 year old man was suffering from a dissecting aortic aneurysm of 7.5 cm. He was unresponsive and near death. He previously, and with unquestioned capacity, executed an advance health directive indicating that he refused surgery. He also had previously told his physician that he would rather die than to face the probable mental and physical damage and quality of life deterioration that would accompany such damage. 

Without question, principles of clinical bioethics would demand respect for the patient’s wishes and directives. In this instance, the patient’s spouse nevertheless demanded that surgery be performed. All other family members agreed with the decision to go forward with the surgery, notwithstanding the significant risk.

The hospital’s anesthesiologists initially refused to participate in the surgery, stating that such an operation had never been performed on someone his age and in his condition, and also noted that patient had refused the surgery.

Nevertheless, the patient's clearly stated wishes and health care directives were ignored, disregarded and disrespected. Strong paternalism replaced the patient’s dignity and autonomy.

The surgeons proceeded despite the dangers, because, they said:  “We were doing what we thought was right.”

Was it Right?

1.    The patient’s written “advanced” health directive declined resuscitation and, specifically, surgery for what he knew and understood to be a dissecting aortic aneurysm.

2.    The patient’s verbal instructions were to not do the surgery. The patient clearly knew the risks of the surgery. He knew of the high risk of respiratory failure, renal failure and brain damage.  He declined to undertake these risks and refused treatment.

3.    The ethics committee under pressure from the patient’s spouse, acquiesced, but without any stated basis for their decision. Texas law requires a statement.

This case is a clear example of the failure to follow principles of clinical bioethics – a return to strong paternalism – and the disregard for a patient’s wishes.

This case was reported in the New York Times. The patient was Dr Michael DeBakey, internationally renowned surgical pioneer, who died on July 11, 2008, two months shy of his 100th birthday.

Should the fact that he was an internationally renowned surgical pioneer matter in deciding whether to ignore his instructions?  If anything, it underscores his knowledge of the risks of such surgery.
His wife and family demanded the surgery be performed. 

Should we ignore a patient’s clear instructions because he was in some way seen as  “more deserving” of the surgery?

Or should we. as a matter of respect for this man, carry out his wishes?

The outcome of the surgery should not matter to our adherence to bioethical principles. It might however, matter to other patients and families to know that he survived for one year with good quality of life. It may serve as a fictitious beacon of hope and result in unnecessary suffering.

Ignoring the legal obligations and bioethical mandate to follow the autonomous decisions of the patient  may  cause unnecessary problems between surrogate decision makers and physicians and hospitals.

It may also result in claims of civil liability for the unnecessary and prolonged suffering and costs of medical care – the same risks the patient did not want to undertake.

Dr. DeBakey had the “fundamental right,” no different than his right of freedom of speech or his freedom of religion, to determine what treatment he would choose to receive or reject. By issuing a written health directive, and repeating that directive to his physician, he also chose to exercise his fundamental right to receive or reject surgery.

His directive was not inconsistent with customary practice in the medical community.  So, what was the motivation behind his physicians’ and his wife’s  demand that the ethics committee, support going forward with surgery without the patient’s consent?

The patient’s physicians enjoyed a long professional and personal relationship with Dr. DeBakey. They wanted him to receive the benefit of the surgery that he had pioneered and which benefited so many patients across the country. Indeed, it does seem a great injustice for him not to receive that benefit.

Yet, his physicians’ decisions did not honor him. We do not honor someone by ignoring his or her clearly stated wishes.

Yes, Dr DeBakey was happy to be alive and functioning well after the surgery and meticulous care.  His physicians I am sure, celebrated their success.

Yet, it is important to ask, if presented with a similar medical dilemma, with the same array of risks and benefits, would Dr. DeBakey have elected to go forward with the surgery?  I think not. He didn’t like the odds the first time and would not want to take that bet a second time any more than he did the first.
Dr. DeBakey’s physicians chose to take that bet on his behalf even though he clearly refused to do so. They felt that their assessment was better and more important than his. They took the risk with his life and they won that bet for him.

Failure of the Ethics Committee

The larger failure here lies with the Ethics Committee of Methodist Hospital System. Their duty was to inform this patient’s physicians and other interested parties, of the bioethical issues that were presented by this dilemma, and to explain their thoughtful application of these principles. They should have, and were obligated to have, provided a written recommendation and their reasoning and justification for supporting or not supporting the proposed surgery.

In fact, Texas law requires that a report must be issued. The law also requires that the report be made a part of the patient’s record. Thus, the Ethics Committee report should have been made part of the Dr DeBakey’s medical record:
Texas Health & Safety Code, Chapter 166. Advance Directives

    § 166.046.  PROCEDURE IF NOT EFFECTUATING A DIRECTIVE OR
TREATMENT DECISION. (a) If an attending physician refuses to honor a patient's advance directive... the physician's refusal shall be reviewed by an ethics or medical committee.  (c) The written explanation must be included in the patient's medical record.

Instead, no written report was issued. According the New York Times report:

“The majority ruled in a consensus without a formal vote. No minutes were kept.”

The Ethics Committee ran from their responsibilities and kept their meeting and determinations and discussions secret. There was no formal vote. No minutes were kept, and so, in essence, the Ethics Committee never, officially, met.  There was no transparency to this momentous, life and death, decision.  

The Ethics Committee at Methodist Hospital System acted with cowardice, which is defined as failing to act in the face of great difficulty and opposition. Instead, all of the ethical issues and principles, the hours spent in comprehensive educational studies, and years of experience by the members of the committee, were worthless. Instead of fulfilling their role, the Committee silently acquiesced, and the reason for having a medical Ethics Committee in the first place, was thwarted.

We must keep in mind that ethics committees are not intended to be a substitute for the best judgment of a physician. The opinions of physicians are not subjugated to ethics committees.

The Hospital Ethics Committee’s role is to inform the decision making process by providing an intelligent and well thought out review of the bioethical issues and applicable ethical principals and legal mandates that must be taken into consideration. Instead, the Ethics Committee of Methodist Hospital System backed away from the task.  They could not ethically or legally justify ignoring the patient’s clearly stated directives. Dr DeBakey’s wife insisted, and his physicians wanted, that surgery should be performed.

This case is an illustration of conflict of interest, family confusion and anger and the need for forthright and consistent application of clinical bioethics experience for the benefit of all patients.

Dr. DeBakey had the “fundamental right,” no different than his right of freedom of speech or his freedom of religion, to determine what treatment he would choose to receive or reject. By issuing a written health directive, and repeating that directive to his physician, he also chose to exercise his fundamental right to receive or reject surgery.

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According to the LA Times, four Japanese citizens, otherwise barred from entering the United States for criminal activities, received liver transplants at UCLA. There has been no statement as to whether these patients were on a waiting list, and if so, where they placed. Nor has it been revealed what the etiology of the liver disease was - the major consideration in determining the candidacy for the transplant.

 One of the patients, reportedly a Yakuza Gang Boss, was helped by the FBI to obtain a US visa in the hope that he would provide the FBI with information in return for arranging the surgery . It is unclear if the FBI assisted in facilitating the surgeries. Additionally a donation of $100,000 was made the patient to the UCLA Medical Center Discretionary Fund.

The surgeries were performed between 2000 and 2004, and in each of those years more than 100 patients died awaiting liver transplants in the Los Angeles area, according to the LA Times.

According to UCLA procedures for liver transplant: “… each patient's case will be presented at a weekly meeting of the UCLA Liver Transplant Consultation Team. This group includes specialists from surgery, adult and pediatric hepatology, cardiology, pulmonary, nephrology, hematology, infectious disease, psychiatry, as well as transplant coordinators and social workers. Thereafter, a determination is be made, to ensure the patient's candidacy for transplant.

Long-term survival is significantly affected by the etiology of liver disease. Without an appropriate assessment of the etiology of liver disease a waiting list becomes meaningless. There are clinically significant differences in the mortality risk ratio which are dependent upon a variety of disease processes as well as the age of the patient

Dr. Ronald Busuttil, the surgeon performing the subject liver transplants, reported in a peer review journal that the etiology of disease is determinative of ranges of the mortality risk ratio from 1.00 for PBC  to a mortality risk ratio of 3.50 for malignancy. Patients older than 55 (at least one of the patients was over 60 years of age at the time of surgery) have an increased mortality risk ratio of (RR 1.59) due to age alone.  
  
Questions:
1.    Should  UCLA be asked to disclose to the news media the listing criteria and etiology of disease of these four patients?

2.    Should the UCLA Ethics Committee have been consulted before these surgeries went forward?
 
3.    Should investigations by governmental agencies, be it the FBI or the Department of Home Land Security, be helped by medical centers in allowing informants to be placed at the top of the waiting list for organ transplant?  

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    The salient ethical and moral principle applicable to physicians’ responsibilities in following a patient’s rejection of artificial life sustaining treatment is the transparency of the conduct of all physicians, medical staff and fundamental understanding by the family and or friends as to what is being done and how it is being done.

    It must be kept in mind that the distinguishing factor between terminal withdrawal or withholding of artificial life sustaining treatment and euthanasia is the patient’s rejection of treatment, either directly or through a properly informed surrogate, of artificial life sustaining treatment. Unambiguous documentation must set forth all discussion between the patient or surrogate, and physicians, nurses, bioethicists, social services and family members.

    It must be clear that no physician or medical staff  is “assisting” in the ending the patient’s life, but  rather following the patient's  decision. Only by being forthright about these factors can real transparency exist.

     It is the fundamental right of all patients to reject medical treatment after all risks have been explained and all options presented and intelligently understood. The withdrawal or withholding of artificial life sustaining treatment  requires the highest level of inquiry and caution.

    Terminal withdrawal or withholding of artificial life sustaining treatment should only be carried out after a collective decision-making process. It should be discussed by a multidisciplinary group including:  Primary Treating Physician, consulting physicians, Bioethisist; Social Worker, Nursing Director of Critical Care; and Nurses involved in the patient’s care.

    If possible, a 24-hour period should pass from the time of the decision to the time of actual terminal withdrawal or withholding of artificial life sustaining treatment. If a surrogate has made the decision, the surrogate must review, understand and sign a form requesting a withdrawal and withholding of treatment.

    It is the primary obligation of a patient’s primary treating physician to assure full communication and documentation. The primary treating physician may delegate this duty to the consultant primarily responsible for the care of the patient.

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