Daniel Hauser - and Medical Confidentiality

I agree with the court’s rulings in the case of Daniel Hauser, highlighted in the media recently. In this case there is as absolute need to continue chemotherapy. It should however be pointed out that the Court ignored Mrs. Hauser’s demand for confidentiality and contributed to this case becoming a spectacle in the media and making Mrs. Hauser the focus of overwhelming media attention, pitting her beliefs against most of the country's. This injudicious conduct may have contributed to the panic of the mother to leave the jurisdiction and hide herself and her son.

The legal issues in this case are, as noted by Arthur Kaplan, from the University of Pennsylvania, on Anderson Cooper's program, are easy. Dr. Kaplan also noted that in many cases psychologists come on board and are generally successful in swaying the family and the minor patient toward recommended treatment. People struggle with medical decisions to withdraw and withhold medical care each day. Many of these dilemmas deal with children. Irrespective of the religious beliefs of the parents this child would nevertheless be required to undergo chemo therapy over the objections of the parents. If the parents were members of the Church of Christ - Christian Science or Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Jehovah's Witnesses - the same legal and ethical issues would have to be confronted.

Patients and their physician, family and friends need to feel free to turn to the court for assistance in controversies surrounding withdrawing and withholding medical care without fear of becoming involved in a media circus.

In this instance the parents adhered to beliefs of a Native American religion.Judge Rodenberg, without any legitimate connection with the legal issues presented, chose to publish his confidential question and answer cross examination of Daniel Hauser, on the court's web site, including inquiry about a Native American religion. This would not have occurred with other more traditionally recognized religions. There is no religious justification to withhold life saving treatment from a minor and the Judge had no legitiamate reason to make it a focus of inquiry.

The Judge ignored Daniel Hauser's right as a minor to confidentiality and this testimony should never have been published.

Daniel Hauser's physicians ignored their bioethical duties to utilize the services of a clinical bioethicist, a psychiatrist or psychologist to intervene and assist in facilitating the exchange of information regarding different treatments and the effectiveness, risk and effect on quality of life of these treatments verses the failing to treat.

If the testimony of Daniel Hauser is accurate, his personal physician never actually sat down with him and established a line of communication  and did not engender a sense of trust.

P 25 of Daniel’s testimony:
Q.  So he [Dr. Bostrom] did not actually tell you, you had cancer?
A.  Right.

Q.  Okay, so you learned of that from your mother?
A.  Right.

Q.  So you and Dr. Bostrom never talked to you like I am talking to you right now?
A.  No.

Daniel was able to understand the purpose of his biopsy procedure, the necessity of determining and distinguishing types of cancer, the need for an ultrasound and that ultrasound reflected the possibility of a pulmonary embolism, which could lead to his death.  

Page 39:
Q.  There was a problem with your left arm at some point?
A.  If I moved my arm too much or jerked it, it could break off and go to the heart and I could have a heart attack.

Q.  Did someone tell you that?
A.  Yeah, the nurse did... I think they did an ultrasound or something……… I think (my arm) was warm…they found it was a clot and they said that could cause problems if it broke loose?

So, after one time of chemotherapy he experienced significant illness, weakness, and was caused to fear for his life.  The judge did not directly ask him nor did he indicate any conversation with his physicians in which he was told that his life depended on him receiving continued chemotherapy.

Notwithstanding his age and his inability to legally consent or refuse treatment, a 13-year-old patient should be told, on a level that he can understand, of the ramifications and risks of accepting or refusing therapy.

Medical Confidentiality:

On the issue of the medical confidentiality Daniel was entitled to have his medical care and medical history kept confidential.  Notwithstanding his mother and/or father’s refusal of treatment, Daniel, through his mother demanded confidentiality. Mrs. Hauser specifically asked the judge to maintain confidentiality for her son.  

Page: 60.  Mrs. Hauser asked the court for a private conversation.

Mrs. Hauser’s demand: “I do not want this out of this room, okay?”

Judge Rodenberg responded:

“Well although you need to be mindful… my plan was to file a copy of the [Daniel’s testimony and medical information] … because – just so you are understanding, the public has a [page 61] legitimate interest in knowing what happened here today.”

The public, because of media attention, may be interested in a lot of things, yet, that does not mean that a patient loses his right to keep his medical care confidential. There is no evidence that Daniel Hauser ever put himself into the “public arena” and waived any confidentiality with respect to his personal life and/or medical care. Confidentiality should have been maintained.

If the court views that disclosure of information is necessary, than historically, the full name of the patient is kept confidential and the case is referred to as, for example, In re Daniel H.

For the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Rehnquist wrote:

It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its proceedings have been conducted outside . . . the public’s full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity. (Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2671, 61L. Ed. 2d 399 (1979).

In West Virginia for example, in a case involving education records, the state Supreme Court of Appeals recognized the public policy of protecting the confidentiality of juvenile information in all court proceedings:  
    
"we are loathe to allow one of the last bastions of privacy, juvenile confidentiality, to be diminished in the least bit,"

 Unfortunately, normal and customary procedures for dealing with ethical issues in the medical community were not utilized and basic law protecting a child’s right of confidentiality were cast aside.



Bernard W. Freedman, JD, MPH


 

Life, for some in Texas, is Cheap

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE CHAPTER 166.039.

PROCEDURE WHEN PERSON HAS NOT EXECUTED OR ISSUED A DIRECTIVE AND IS INCOMPETENT OR INCAPABLE OF COMMUNICATION

For the most vulnerable patients, without friends or family, life for some medical patients in Texas, is cheap.  On vague and specious grounds and without proper oversight or transparency, physicians may withdraw life sustaining treatment from a patient, even if the patient is conscious, talking, and aware of his or her surroundings. This statute allows this to occur if a physician treating the patient concludes that the patient will die within six months and there is no advance health directive to the contrary.

There is a fundamental liberty interest which permits a patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment. There is also a fundamental constitutional right, which each person has, to his or her life.  This right is protected by the due process clause. Yet, Texas law makes a presumption that leads to an unjustified decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment. The statute declares that merely because a patient has not filled out or written an advance health directive does not mean they don’t want to die.  So, under Texas law, a conscious, but incompetent patient will be allowed to die if a physician, with “reasonable” medical judgment decodes that the patient will die within six months. “Reasonable” medical judgment is a low standard for the death of a patient. It does not require a "probability of death" with 6 months – only a reasonable and unchecked judgment. Moreover, the available safeguards which would require the review by a hospital ethics committee, or a court of law, is not a hurdle that is required to be cleared before removing the patient from life sustaining care. As long as there is no advanced health directive, and no family or friend to object, a physician can order the cessation of life support, if a non-treating physician or a member of the ethics committee agrees. Nor is there any effort or requirement of due diligence that must be made to locate friends or family.

In looking at this statutory scheme we should keep in mind the words of another Texan:

           "You do not examine legislation in the light of the benefits it will convey if properly administered,but in the light of the wrongs it would do and the harms it would cause if improperly administered."
Lyndon B. Johnson

A conscious competent patient (with a terminal illness) who asks for help to end suffering may not be helped by their physician to end her life. This is considered physician-assisted suicide and is prohibited by law.  However, under Texas law, a conscious patient who cannot decide for him or herself, and therefore needs the utmost protection, can have life-sustaining treatment independently halted by their physician and die without violating the patient’s constitutionally protected right to life. To overcome a fundamental constitutional right a full and comprehensive review of all relevant facts, opinions, motivation, bias, undue influence, is guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Why were these safeguards unconstitutionally cast aside by the Texas legislature?

It is clear that the right of a patient to withhold or withdraw from any treatment, including life sustaining treatment, is predicated on a legal tradition protecting the autonomous decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. However, we must be careful to make the distinction that the right to refuse treatment is the patient’s right, not the right of a physician or hospital, or legislature. A presumption that the patient would choose death rather than life seems to be founded on a legislatively created principle that people, without known friends or family, rights can be disregarded and that the economic interest of the state is sufficient to overcome life. The Texas law that permits a casual and unregulated state imposed medical decision making scheme is unconstitutional.

In most circumstances, there are no specific statistical data on death from a specific disease within six months.  When there are one or more studies, they are based upon information gathered from different medical communities with different demographics . The data will vary based on the age, type, and extent of disease and with different accompanying disease processes.  Nevertheless, this statue presumes that a physician, irrespective of her specialty, is aware of all studies, and that all studies are based on relevant and sound epidemiological principles, and sufficiently powered biostatistical results.

In this way, patients are left to the creative medical imaginations and empirical and anecdotal experience. which will vary between physicians, that will determine a decision of life or death. 

Review by the entire ethics committee, with a written explanation, must be legally mandated. There is, at present, a Bill in the Texas Legislature to amend  this statute, Section 166.039. A requirement for mandatory ethics committee review should be included.

The Texas statute’s 6-month standard is illusory and prone to ethnic, racial, socioeconomic status and age bias. This, more often then not, will be a member of a minority group, whose family and/or friends cannot be located, or the patient is simply alone. So, the statute targets the most vulnerable patients who need the highest level of protection.