Can late stage abortions be murder ?

 

Dr. Nicola Riley is being held without bail in Utah following her arrest on December 28. 2011. She worked for Dr. Steven Brigham in New Jersey, who owns abortion clinics.   Both of them have been charged with the crime of murder for performing late-term abortions in Maryland. Their apparent modus operandi was to “start” abortions in New Jersey and complete them in Maryland where abortion laws are less stringent.

Maryland has a Fetal Homicide Law that permits murder charges to be brought against people who “intend to cause the death of a viable fetus, yet specifically excludes physicians carrying out abortions. Section 2-103(e)  Murder or manslaughter of viable fetus states:

Inapplicable to medical professionals administering lawful care. -- Nothing in this section subjects a physician or other licensed medical professional to liability for fetal death that occurs in the course of administering lawful medical care.

Reuters News reported on January 9th that : Cecil County State's Attorney Ellis Rollins said the case could be the first of its kind to test Maryland's 2005 fetal homicide law, under which murder charges can be brought against people who intend to cause the death of a viable fetus. The charge of murder could only stand if the medical treatment – the abortion – was found to be unlawful medical care.

About 38 other states have similar statutes and for the most part, these statutes have been applied, as the legislature intended, in criminal cases where an intentional injury to a pregnant woman that kills a fetus would result in a charge for murder.

The cases against Drs. Riley and Bingham are seemingly intended to test the use of this statute in cases of abortion. This case is especially egregious, as 35 and 36 week term fetuses are alleged to have been found in the doctors’ freezer.

Charges include both first and second degree murder.

In 2003, the United States Congress passed the partial birth abortion ban act defining defined as any abortion where the death of the fetus occurs when the “entire fetal head or any part of the fetal trunk passed the naval is outside of the mother’s body.”

(a)    Any physician who…, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.

In the 2007 case of Gonzalez versus Planned Parenthood, the United State Supreme Court in a five to four decision held that the congressional ban on partial birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to have an abortion.

Under this federal statute, the penalty:

Any physician who, … knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.

It is unclear at this point what type of abortion was performed by Drs. Riley and Brigham. 

 

 

Rasouli Decision: We don't need permission to withdraw life sustaining care

 

 

On December 22, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada agreed to hear the case of Cuthbertson and Rubenfeld versus Hassan Rasouli. The appellants, Drs. Brian Cuthbertson and Gordon Rubenfeld) are Mr. Rasouli’s physicians.

  

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The question before the court is whether physicians must seek approval from a legislatively created board of review before withdrawing a patient from life sustaining treatment. The statue was passed for a variety of reasons, including establishing a uniform standard of practice for the protection of patients across the country.

The review by the Consent and Capacity Board is only required if there is some objection by the surrogate decision maker. If the decision maker objects, he or she is required to follow principles of acting in the patient’s best interest as set forth in the “Health Care Consent Act.”  

http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_96h02_e.htm

“...a health practitioner … may believe that the SDM (substitute decision maker) is not following these principles. If this happens, that person may apply to the board for a determination as to whether the principles have been followed and order to the SDM to comply with the act. Use of this application is limited to the health care provider of the incapable person (e.g. family members cannot apply to the board). Whenever an application of this type is received, the law provides that the patient is deemed to have applied for a review of his or her capacity to make the relevant decision…”

  Purpose of the Health Care Act:

  As a set forth in the appellate decision, the purpose of the Health Care Act is to establish rules that can be used consistently in all settings; provide and facilitate treatment, admissions, and other assistance for persons who lack capacity; and ensure a significant participation of family members when the person lacks capacity to make decisions.

The Consent and Capacity Board is an independent provincial tribunal created to adjudicate issues of consent in capacity and whether or not the substitute decision maker is acting  in accord with the patient’s wishes or in his or her best interest.

  • There is no charge to the participants
  • Any party may attend
  • Family members and friends are also encouraged to attend.
  • Each party may have a lawyer, call witnesses and bring documents. 
  • Each party, and the board members, may ask questions of each witness. 
  • Thereafter, the board meets in private to make a decision. 
  • The board will issue its decision within one day.
  • Written reasons will be issued if any of the parties request them.

Drs. Cuthbertson and Rubenfeld argue that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and other physicians have examined Mr. Rasouli and agreed with this assessment. 

They want to take him off life support and provide palliative care until he dies.

The decision maker argues that he is minimally conscious and remains aware of his surroundings and that if the physicians do not want to follow her wishes that they should apply to the Consent and Capacity Board and let the board decide whether the proposed course of action is in the respondents best interest. 

A three day hearing was held in the Canadian Superior Court of Justice in February and March of 2011. The court found in favor of the respondent (Rasouli) and against the appellants Cuthbertson and Rubenfeld. 

The court ordered that the question of continued life sustaining treatment must be referred to the Consent and Capacity Board, and, pending that decision the physicians were not permitted to withdraw or withhold life sustaining treatment nor place the patient in palliative care.

Rather than doing so, Cuthbertson and Rubenfeld brought their case to the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeal for Ontario, original case Rasouli versus Sunnybrook Health Science Center, 2011 docket number C53442).

Indeed, if they are wrong the patient will be dead.

Cuthbertson and Rubenfeld make two arguments to avoid compliance with the law:

1.  “…if it is found that their decision to withhold or withdraw treatment falls below the requisite standard of care, they may be held accountable.” (Page 7 of the appellate decision). Indeed, if they are wrong the patient will be dead. The standard as set for the by the Canadian legislature, is to seek approval from the Board. The legislation protects physicians from being held liable:

If a treatment is withheld or withdrawn in accordance with a plan of treatment and with a consent to the plan of treatment that a health practitioner believes, on reasonable grounds and in good faith, to be sufficient for the purpose of this Act, the health practitioner is not liable for withholding or withdrawing the treatment.

2.         Cuthbertson and Rubenfeld argue that withdrawing life sustaining care and prescribing a shift to palliative care is not “treatment” and that, therefore, no consent is needed to withdraw life sustaining care. Putting Mr. Rasouli on life support was a treatment decision and taking him off life support is a treatment decision, just as much as prescribing a medication for a patient and stopping the medication because it is not working.

Part 2 of this article will discuss the relevant ethical basis, legal reasoning and competing moral viewpoints.  

 

Early Withdrawal of Life Sustaining Treatment in Severe Traumatic Brain Injuries, by Bernard W. Freedman JD, MPH

 

CDC Statistics Traumatic Brain Injuries

On August 29, 2011 the Canadian Medical Association published the findings of a multicenter cohort study evaluating the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for patients who had suffered a traumatic brain injury. This study is of particular interest because by the nature of the injury  patients cannot make decisions for themselves and generally such decisions in patients in end-of-life care have a variety of comorbidities which make an evaluation of the efficacy of the decisions to withdraw life sustaining care difficult. 

720 patients were evaluated from six different major medical centers. Of the 720, 228 patients did not survive.  160 patients had life sustaining treatment withdrawn in the first three days of hospitalization.

 In approximately 50% of the patients, deaths occurred within the first three days of admittance to the ICU. Most of the deaths were associated with withdrawing life-sustaining care (64%) yet the proportion varied significantly across the six medical centers, from 30.4% to 92.9%

Considering deaths due to withdrawal of life-sustaining care within the first three hospital days, an overall average of 45.6% occurred. However examining the outcomes from the six medical centers, the range of deaths due to withdrawal of life-sustaining care ranged from 22.2% to 59.1%.

According to the “medical teams” and who participated in the care, the reason given for withdrawing life-sustaining care was:

1.     Poor chance of survival. (54.4%).

2.     Prognosis was incompatible with the patient’s wishes. (33.8%)

3.     A poor long-term neurologic prognosis. (28.5%)

These stated justifications are suspect because of the rapidity that decisions to withdraw life-sustaining care were arrived at. As the authors of this study indicate:

 “in this specific population of patients, the decision to withdraw life-sustaining therapy made by patients’ relatives and medical teams is mainly based on prognostic information. Our findings are particularly concerning because many decisions to withdraw life-sustaining therapy were made early in our study: 64% of the patients who died within three days of admission to an ICU had life-sustaining therapy withdrawn. In some instances, this may be too early for accurate neuroprognostication.”

1. “Poor chance of survival. (54.4%)”

     Means: She is probably going to die soon anyway, so let’s not wait and see, waste our time and costs, and extubate now.

This is a, " She is probably going to die soon so let's not wait and see  and waste time and costs and extubate now" type of argument.

Yet, if the patient is going to die “soon” anyway, why not let her die without withdrawing the ventilator - for example. Waiting can only help us have a clearer picture of the degree of the damage and whether or not the patient will show any improvement in her neurologic status?

           2.  “Prognosis was incompatible with the patient’s wishes. (33.8%)”

 This is a “He wouldn’t want to live this way” kind of reasoning. If the physicians for this patient could say to the family, something like: “I can tell you with authority that your son will never be able to have any modicum of awareness, he will never eat on his own, …” If this could be established then the “He wouldn’t want to live this way” reasoning may be an ethically sufficient decision, if in fact the wishes of the patient are clear. However, without such a established prognosis, how can we arrive at a reasonable assessment as to what, exactly, the patient would want. There is little ability to actually assess whether decisions to withdraw life support are genuinely the patient wishes or the wishes of others.

The question that must be posed is whether or not waiting will clarify the prognosis of the patient. If so, then it is indeed premature to withdraw. The fact that, as determined in this study, most patients die after withdrawal from ventilation support, serves to emphasize the need to wait.

“A poor long-term neurologic prognosis. (28.5%)”

This is a: “he probably will survive, but, …” argument. This is the worse excuse of the three listed. It states that: “he probably will survive and if we do not remove life support while he still needs it, someone will probably have to take care of him later. This is tantamount to homicide. We have a non-terminal patient with undetermined future neurologic status who we are going to withdraw life sustaining care to end his life. The total number of patients studied in this cohort was 720. 492 patients did survive, with considerable variability between the participating medical centers.  The authors’ state:

“This raises the concern that differences in mortality between centers may be partly due to variation in physician’s perceptions of long-term prognosis and physicians practice patterns for recommending withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy.”

It is the job of the physicians to treat the patient, not satisfy the needs of the family. Hence, great care must be taken to determine and effectuate the wishes of the patient.

 

Patient Access to Cancer Care and Proposed Medicare Budget Cuts - Press Release

July 27, 2011

ASCO Urges Policymakers to Protect Patient Access to Cancer Care from Debt Ceiling Negotiation Package

The American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO ) is deeply concerned about the proposed $3 billion in cuts to Medicare reimbursement as part of a debt ceiling negotiation package. If the cuts are put into place, patient access to cancer care will be threatened as previous cuts to Medicare have already caused oncology practices to close, consolidate and turn away Medicare patients.

ASCO is closely monitoring the situation, and advocating on behalf of oncology practices and patients. This week, ASCO placed print and online advertisements in Capitol Hill publications including Politico, The Hill, Roll Call and CQ. To learn more about all of ASCO's efforts on this issue, visit www.asco.org/protectaccess.

End of Life Care: the Doctor-Patient Relationship A Refusal to Communicate

 

The New England Journal of Medicine recently published an article entitled: “ The Palliative Care Information Act in Real Life,” (NEJM 364;No.20 May 2011), regarding a New York statute that requires a physician to have discussions of end of life treatment options with the patient when the patient is “terminally ill.” Alan Astrow MD and Beth Popp, MD, the authors of the article, are troubled by the phrase terminal illness. They argue that the definition in the statute is vague and an improper interference with the physician-patient relationship. The fact that they find the phrase, “terminal illness” troublesome, is troublesome.

The authors fail to understand basic concepts in clinical bioethics as well as case law as to the duties of physicians dealing with critically ill patients and the provision of information on all relevant and alternative methods of treatment. Perhaps they think like so many others, that end of life care planning is reduced, basically, to one question: If you are close to death and your brain is in a persistent vegetative state do you want us to remove you from life support or not resuscitate you if you go into cardiac arrest? This is not the case. A variety of options are available to patients who are critically ill. It is foolhardy to wait until a patient is unable to actually explain their wishes to the physician and allow an adversarial situation to be created between family members, friends, physicians and other medical staff, as well as possibly leading to referring the matter to the ethics committee, the hospital administration, or hospital attorneys.

A variety of options should be addressed as early as possible and relative to the disease trajectory. In addition to discussing the anticipated medical course, differing degrees of brain injury or damage, the likelihood of recovery and anticipated risks and treatment options and related issues of quality of life. The following are some suggested talking points:

a.     The selection of one person who will act as surrogate decision-maker: the patient must understand that the surrogate decision maker only has any say if the patient cannot speak for herself. It should be made clear that the purpose of the surrogate is to effectuate the wishes the patient, not the wishes of the surrogate. Additionally it should be made clear that the surrogate does not have to be limited to a family member.

b.     A patient has the right to know (subject to the therapeutic exception) applicable Evidence-Based Medical (EBM) information to help the patient understand and evaluate risks and benefits of various treatment options (including lack of treatment) based on clinically significant research, such as: cohort studies, double-blind clinical research, meta-analysis, etc.

c.     Discussion with family and clergy should be encouraged;

d.     Advise that he or she may seek a second opinion. Aside from the fact that the patient may or may not want a second opinion, offering to arrange one will often provide a sense of confidence in the physicians treatment plan.

e.     At some point in time the patient may want to be transferred home on hospice and die peacefully with his or her family rather than in the ICU. Thus, palliative care needs to be explained and the probabilities presented to the patient with respect to longevity and quality of life.

f.      Does the patient have any religious requirements that they wish to follow with respect to receiving pain medication that may or may not hasten death? Many patients are willing to receive pain medication but not to the point where it may hasten death. Others may want to receive all necessary pain medication and sedation should be kept as pain free and comfortable as possible.

g.     Does the patient have religious convictions with respect to receiving blood or blood products?

And so on.

The rights of patients to make their own medical decisions create reciprocal duties on the part of their physicians to respect and uphold these rights.

The authors argue that there is a “standard of care” that dictates when physicians must tell their patients all relevant medical information. This is not true.

 

The standard is not determined by the medical community, but rather, by the patient him or her self. It is not a medical question; it is a personal, individual and unique decision by the patient, of which can only be made if all medical information and options or explained.

 

As one commentator advises physicians: “If you don’t speak early, you lose your voice.” Carol Taylor, RN, PhD advises patients: “For someone who sits with families trying to make these life and death decisions, I can say that planning is the greatest gift to your family.”


What is it that stands in the way of early discussion for many physicians?

The authors of the article, Drs, Astrow and Pope, claimed that:

 “… physicians need to feel comfortable communicating their values and experiences and providing non authoritarian guidance and support while expressing interest in and respect for the experiences and values of patients and families.”

This statement is ignorant of the law, foolish and, moreover, it is surprising that the NEJM would publish this misguided advice.

Physicians do not have to feel comfortable. What difference does it make if the physician “feels comfortable” or not when carrying out his or her responsibilities. Many physicians, if not most, will never feel comfortable in such situations. What is important is that the patient is not “comfortable” and may be fearful, confused and in need of all necessary information. (Without the provision of all relevant information, there cannot be any informed consent and the physicians may be found civilly liable in addition to incurring state imposed fines).

Secondly, it is clearly inappropriate for a physician to convey his or her values to the patient. A physician’s values are of no moment whatsoever. It is, on the contrary, the patient's values alone that should guide decision. Indeed, physicians’ values should not even be discussed or mentioned. If so, the patient would receive different guidance dependent upon which physician’s door she walks through.

Thirdly, the physician is always in a position of authority.  The author’s suggestion that they can counsel a patient in a non-authoritarian manner will not work. That cannot be avoided. So, any suggestions, as to a physician’s values must be avoided. The values of the physician are not in issue.

The decisions of the patient should as John Stuart Mill once describe, be a product of  “…free, voluntary and undeceived consent and participation…”

The authors provide us with a scenario of an 85-year-old man with gastrointestinal cancer that had metastasized to the lung.

“… when his cancer and its spread were diagnosed two years ago,

 he was already frail.”

At this point, if not long before, the patient should have been given the opportunity to consider many of the types of questions listed above.

The patient may have benefited from the knowledge, for example, that in a recent study of the 151 patients with metastatic non-small cell carcinoma, early palliative care led to significant improvement in quality of life and mood and that patients receiving earlier palliative care and less aggressive care often had longer survival rate.” If this 85-year-old patient with metastatic lung cancer was not presented with these and like information from applicable and relevant and authoritative studies, then the patient lost the opportunity to have longer survival and improved quality of life.

Finally, Drs, Astrow and Pope are concerned with the interference of the state into the practice of medicine. I agree that interference of the state into the practice of medicine is something that must be vigorously challenged. In this situation, however, the statute refers to the necessity of ensuring the rights of patients rather than medical practice

 

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Rationing "scarce medical resources" and lying to the patient - do these go hand in hand? 7 comments

 

Rationing "scarce medical resources" and lying to the patient - do these go hand in hand?


7 comments


Claudia Ruiz M.D • I don't think so, I'm from Mexico, and I have worked plenty with the mayan communities, they really don't have any acces to medicines o medical attention. We did our best to get them what they need, but sometimes it is impossible. Anyways, I never lie to my patients, they deserve to know the truth always. Maybe it is a different situation in the United States and the HMOs, but in principle, I don't think it is ethical to lie and withhold information to people, specially if that information is for the best of the patient.


      

           

Henry Levenson,M.D. • No, rationing health care does not equal lying to patients. It is better to explain to the best of your ability why referrals were declined or not authorized. Patients seem to assume that physicians are responsible for the reasons why health care is rationed.


           

           

M. Sara Rosenthal • In the U.S., rationing is usually not done according to an ethical framework (such as beneficence); it is usually done according to "ability to pay": if we were transparent about THAT -- we wouldn't have opposition to universal healthcare in the U.S. by the very people who could benefit from it. Transparency about access is really the issue.


           

           

Bernard Freedman, JD, MPH • Follow up Comment: Rationing : Withholding Medical Care by Lying to the Patient 

"Rationing" of medical care and “triage” are different. 

Triage prioritizes the use of limited medical resources when sufficient resources are not available. 

Rationing is the withholding of available care for political/economic reasons. 
With respect to rationing, therefore, it must be decided whether or not the patient is going to be told the truth. 

The ethical question here is whether patients must be told that medical care is being withheld, or if a standard practice will sanction lying to their faces. 
In his book “Pricing Life” Dr. Peter Ubel provides us with his definition of rationing. He says that the clinician must, 
(1) Withhold, withdraw or fail to recommend a service that, in the clinician’s best judgment, is in the patient’s best medical interests; 
(2) Act primarily to promote the financial interest of someone other than the patient, including an organization, society at large, or the clinician himself or herself, and 
(3) Have control over the use of the medically beneficial service” (Pricing Life – why it is time for health care rationing, Peter A. Ubel, M.D., MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 2000). 
The phrase “withhold, withdraw or fail to recommend” defines rationing as outright dishonesty with the patient – violative of the legally required fiduciary role in physician-patient relationships. 
So, I agree with Dr. Rosenthal that, indeed, transparency is the real issue


           

Marie Cartwright • Withholding, withdrawing or failing to recommend a service does not imply, in any way, dishonesty. It rather describes an informed attitude a physician will take towards a patient regarding a particular procedure and their candidacy for that procedure. A physician, for instance, can withhold a procedure from a patient while still being honest about the reasons for doing so, and rightly so. 

In the UK, for instance, candidates for hip replacement surgeries are (or were several years ago) denied the surgery until they brought their BMIs down to a healthy level. In other words, obese candidates were denied hip replacements based solely on their weight. I initially struggled with this particular topic because it seemed to have a tone of infinite regression- patients who required hip replacements would have a much easier time reaching a healthy weight if they had a healthy hip! However, if the supply is far less than the demand, we must also take into account that obese patients who received a hip replacement would also probably need another replacement sooner than those within a healthy weight range. 

In terms of honestly, however, the patient-doctor relationship cannot exist without trust. Lying should never be present, under any circumstances.


           

           

Bernard Freedman, JD, MPH • Thanks for the discussion. This is a growing quandary that calls for clarity from medical, ethical and public policy points of view. There is a difference between withholding or withdrawing efficacious treatment and telling a patient what you are doing and why, and “failing to recommend” an efficacious treatment and keeping it a secret under the guise of having what you call an “informed attitude.” So, I must ask, what is it that informs a physician’s attitude that justifies keeping the decision hidden? In other words lying to the person you have the highest duty to be honest with. Yet, you say in the next sentence of your comment that it is ok to” withhold the treatment while still being honest about the reasons for doing so.” I am unclear whether you are really saying that withholding the truth, lying, is acceptable. 
You give the example of the obese patient who needs a hip replacement but is denied the surgery unless he or she loses the weight. The denial may be justified, but is the patient told the reason for the denial? Do you tell your patient that they must lose weight before the hip replacement will be permitted? Of course, I believe, you do. Otherwise there would be no incentive for the patient to lose the weight. 
It is the trust aspect, the moral imperative of truth telling between physician and patient that is, I believe, at risk when rationing truly scarce resources.


           

Marie Cartwright • I think we are on the same page in many respects here. But, if I may clarify a possible misunderstanding- You said, "So, I must ask, what is it that informs a physician’s attitude that justifies keeping the decision hidden?" I definitely didn't intend to imply that physicians should keep their decisions, or reasons for their decisions, hidden. I believe quite the opposite. By informed attitude, I meant to refer to the physicians as "gatekeepers" who decide who can have what procedure, and when, and their decisions, or attitudes, are informed by factors solely about the patient. Physicians, after all, are the experts that we rely upon to help us better our health and in some circumstances, "save" us. In essence, and hopefully to answer your question, withholding a treatment and withholding the truth are two entirely different things. In my previous comment, I said that withholding a particular treatment is in no way dishonest. However, withholding a treatment without justifying or explaining it to the patient goes against the patient-doctor relationship and also is counter productive for any patient's treatment. 

Regarding the hip replacement patients, I believe the the denial must, in all situations, be explained to the patient. I don't really believe that truth telling is at risk in any situation, much less the rationing situation. A patient must be told why he/she is no longer a candidate for a particular procedure. Even when supply is scarce, to be dishonest serves no purpose.


                                   

 

Rationing Medical Care Part II

 

Efforts to encourage (or compel) physicians to lie to their patients were faced years ago when “gag clauses” were inserted into contracts between HMO’s and contracted physicians. The gag clause established a contractual obligation on the part of the physician to withhold information regarding treatment modalities that were not within the HMO protocol of allowable categories of care. 

Contractually, it is common to exclude specific types or categories of care - “We will pay for this, we won’t pay for that.” Every contract of insurance has exclusions. Gag clauses, however, go further. They contractually bar physicians from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the patient from making clear what relevant treatments are available in the medical community. If there were more effective treatments available, the physician nevertheless had to withhold such information. Physicians, therefore, had to choose whether to breach their fiduciary duty to their patient, or breach their contractual duty to the HMO if they revealed the availability of superior care for the patient.

For a patient, there was no real choice. No information that would enable a comparison between alternative treatments, nor any opportunity to confer with other physicians regarding alternative treatments.

This, to be clear, is fraud: purposeful misrepresentation and intentional withholding of critical information by a fiduciary and relied upon by the patient to his or her detriment, namely serious injury or death.

In 1990s, the AMA asked managed care organizations to withdraw gag clauses from their contracts with physicians. Though gag clauses have drifted, we hope, out of existence, medical rationing resurrects the same fraudulent behavior and, again, attempts to persuade or compel physicians to participate in the entire charade.

Patients will have to be told the truth unless our moral foundations of democracy are to be drastically diminished. If the informed consent process is genuine it must reveal to the patient all alternative methods of treatment – whether they can afford it or not. Patients are accustomed to being told that certain categories of treatments, though needed, may not covered by their insurance. If the policy is ambiguous then that issue of coverage can be legally and rapidly challenged.

Protocols to ration health care, if they surreptitiously contribute to the worsening of illness or death, will once again be an attempt by those who make policy to encourage or compel physicians to change from their absolute loyalty to their patient to become coerced agents of fraudulent socioeconomic policy.

Part III to follow: Efforts to Ration Care and Value Based Medicine

 

Clinical Bioethics - Rationing - the Ethics of Lying to the Patient - Part I

 

Rationing : Withholding Medical Care by Lying to the Patient

Rationing of medical care and “triage” are different.

Triage prioritizes the use of limited medical resources when resources are insufficient for immediate treatment. 

Rationing is the withholding of available care for political/economic reasons.

With respect to rationing, therefore, it must be decided whether or not the patient is going to be told the truth.

The requirement of informed consent cannot cease to exist because of political/economic policy. Nevertheless the degree of informed consent may vary with the degree and type of risk. Informed consent for a blood pressure medication may not require any specific discussion if the medications are reasonably the same in term of efficacy of treatment.

The physician has an affirmative duty to raise the question and answer such questions by describing all “available” treatment.

On the other end of the spectrum, withholding information about hemodialysis in a patient with multi-organ failure requires an explanation of all risks of treatment and non-treatment alike. Life expectancy, quality of life, prolongation of the process of dying and so on must be discussed in specific detail. Religious considerations may come into play as well. For example, some religious doctrines draw a line between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” care – ordinary care being required, where extraordinary care is not.

Nor can a physician simply wait to see if the patient inquires about other treatment that may be available. The physician has an affirmative duty to raise the question and answer such questions and breaking down “available” methods of treatment.

Part II will address policy considerations and legal ramifications of rationing medical care.

 

Withdrawing and Withholding Life Sustaining Care From Conscious, Non Terminal, Incompetent Part II

 

Physician Liability: Withdrawing and Withholding Life Sustaining Care From  Conscious, Non Terminal, Incompetent Patients – Part II

There are different standards that must be appreciated and respected before a physician can support a decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment from a non terminal and incompetent patient.

This scenario requires the highest degree of protection for the patient. Our fundamental rights are the most important when we are the most vulnerable. Patients in this category are weak, often confused and subject to the effect of bias and undue influence. When illness requires life sustaining treatment family members may experience sympathy for the patient as well as opportunity to end their burden of caring for the patient. Some family members have said to others: "you have done so much, your life has been put on hold, how can we afford to pay for this care, etc. This can result in a request to withdraw or withhold artificial life support for what may be seen as being in every one's best interest. This often occurs in adult children caring for an elderly parent or spouse.

This responsibility for caring for patients at home falls predominantly on women. Women often care for both an elderly parent and their young children at the same time. Many, as well, must work to support the family. Yet, this understandable burden cannot be used as a justification or rationale for the termination of life sustaining treatment. Physicians must never allow themselves to place the needs of the family above the best interests of the patient. Physicians must not allow family interests to become a guide to decision making – even if it results in volatile or abusive confrontations with, or threats by, family members.

Withdrawing life sustaining care from a conscious, non-terminal patient, even if competent who refuses artificial life support, is thwart with risk for the treating physician. In a California case that was ultimately decided be the State Supreme Court, barred withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from a minimally conscious, non-terminal patient when there was not clear and convincing evidence that refusing treatment would be what the patient would want if able to speak for himself.

 

The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society deems necessary in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication, to allocate the risk of error between the litigants, and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision…. Thus, “the standard of proof may depend upon the ‘gravity of the consequences that would result from an erroneous determination of the issue involved. …courts have applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when necessary to protect important rights.

The legislature in Pennsylvania dealt with this dilemma by specifically codifying a limitation on physicians precluding the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment in non-terminal patients whether competent or not.

Health care necessary to preserve life shall be provided to an individual

who has neither an end-stage medical condition nor is permanently

unconscious,… 20 Pa.C.S. §5462(c)(1).

If a demand is made by a surrogate decision maker to terminate life sustaining care in a non terminal, conscious and incompetent patient, physicians, as a matter of customary practice, should request immediate review by the ethics committee as well as an experienced clinical bioethicist, followed by written recommendation which should be placed in the patient's chart. This will provide support and protection against liability risk for all physicians on the case, and protect the patient.  Thereafter, if there is any disagreement between the physicians, ethics committee member, bioethicist, or surrogate decision makers, or other family members or close friends, consideration should be given to petition the court for review.

 

Survival in Hospital Cardiac Arrest - Challenges for Hospitalists


The September 2010 publication of “The Hospitalist” reviews the overall survival rates for cardiac arrest patients.

This article reports that patients frequently have unrealistic expectations and overestimate their chances of survival. Patients predict post-arrest CPR survival at 64%, while the rate is 17%. Most important is that in nearly half of the patients who initially expressed the desire for CPR, once they were informed of the actual estimates, they changed their minds and code status was changed.

It is difficult for many hospitalists to discuss DNR orders with patients. There is not a trusting relationship formed over time. Therefore it is often difficult to broach the subject with patient's or their surrogate decision makers.

For an in-depth and legitimate conversation leading to an informed consent to take place there must be a serious and comprehensive discussion of the patient's history and resuscitation statistics to the degree that they are reliable and clinically significant. The article notes that the “presence of hepatic insufficiency, acute stroke, immunodeficiency, renal failure, or dialysis were associated with lower survival rates.” The authors also note that survival rates are lower with metastatic disease and other malignancies.

Age and a history from prior skilled nursing facilities were associated with poorer survival rates and racial statistics also play a part in survival rates. This article discusses a study that reviewed the medical records of 433,985 Medicare patients 65 years and older who underwent in-hospital CPR. Patients 85 and older had a 6% chance of surviving hospital discharge. This, however, is a statistic and cannot be provided to patients without a detailed discussion of their specific medical condition. Survival rates tend to be lower in patients who are black/nonwhite. Blacks and nonwhites are reported to use CPR at a higher rate but with lower survival rates.

Most importantly, any discussion must include a description of the probable quality of life with post arrest survival. The authors take note that in post resuscitation survivors, in 86% of patients with pre-arrest cognitive abilities remain the same on discharge.  Please note that a boilerplate prediction of survival will not pass legal muster.

A Cautionary Note: We should also be alert to the fact that some patients may tend to have a grimmer perspective of survival because of a diagnosis of a malignancy, albeit the cancer is in early stages and not immediately life-threatening. Fear of “cancer” does frighten patients to the point where they will opt for a DNR order prematurely when it may result in an unnecessary early death. Hospitalists, therefore, must include a detailed description of cancer staging, and in such instances take a wait and see position to allow the discussion to continue with the patient’s primary treating physician.